R. v E

Expert psychological evidence is admissible where it is capable of showing psychological injury consistent with the alleged offending. It is not inadmissible oath-helping merely because it may support a complainant’s account. Its causation and weight remain matters for the jury, particularly where other long-term events could explain the condition.

The adequacy of a summing-up must be assessed in the context of the whole trial. A judge should identify significant inconsistencies relied on by the defence, but an omission will not make convictions unsafe where the jury received reliable general directions, heard the evidence and counsel’s submissions, and understood the central conflict they had to resolve.

The appellant was convicted before Judge Blake and a jury at the Crown Court at Manchester Minshull Street of eleven counts of indecent assault contrary to section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, six counts of sexual activity with a child contrary to section 9(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and one count of attempting penetrative sexual activity with a child under 16. He received concurrent sentences of up to seven years’ imprisonment.

On his appeal against conviction, he challenged the admission and subsequent direction concerning agreed psychological evidence about the complainant’s symptoms. He also contended that the judge had failed adequately to address material inconsistencies in the evidence. The central issue was whether those matters rendered the jury’s verdicts unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. None of the grounds showed that the convictions were unsafe.
2. The agreed psychologist’s evidence was admissible. Properly analysed, it was evidence of psychological injury consistent with the complainant’s allegations, analogous to medical evidence of physical injury consistent with an allegation. It was therefore relevant for the jury when deciding where the truth lay. It did not amount merely to an expert assertion that the complainant was truthful.
3. The direction adequately confined the use of that evidence. The judge made clear that the psychologist had not said the complainant’s account was true, had not necessarily attributed the symptoms to child sexual abuse, and had not excluded other repeated or long-term events as a cause. The jury had to decide the truth of the allegations and the weight, if any, to give the evidence.
4. The judge should preferably have identified the specific inconsistencies on which the defence relied. However, adequacy of directions depends on the whole trial. The jury had heard the evidence and the parties’ speeches, received standard directions on reliability and credibility, and understood the direct conflict between the complainant’s account and the appellant’s denial. The omission did not render the verdicts unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)—the appeal against conviction was dismissed.
• Crown Court at Manchester Minshull Street—on 20 December 2010, the appellant was convicted before Judge Blake and a jury of offences including indecent assault contrary to section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and sexual activity with a child contrary to section 9(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.