Unah, R. v

Under section 25(5) of the Identity Cards Act 2006, an honest belief that a false identity document is genuine does not, without more, constitute a reasonable excuse for possessing it. Parliament's omission of an express knowledge requirement prevents belief alone from operating as a defence.

However, the circumstances in which the document was obtained, and an honest belief arising from them, may explain why it was retained rather than destroyed or delivered to the authorities. They are relevant to the objective question whether the defendant had a reasonable excuse. That issue should be left to the jury unless no reasonable jury could find that the asserted facts were capable of amounting to such an excuse.

The appellant, a Nigerian national with indefinite leave to remain, possessed an expired passport whose biographical page was counterfeit. She said that a friend had obtained it for her in Nigeria and that she believed it to be genuine.

The trial judge ruled, as a preliminary issue, that her lack of knowledge that the passport was false could not amount to a reasonable excuse under section 25(5) of the Identity Cards Act 2006. Following that ruling, she pleaded guilty and received a community sentence requiring 100 hours of unpaid work.

She appealed against conviction on the ground that the judge had construed section 25(5) incorrectly.

1. Appeal allowed; conviction quashed. The trial judge erred by treating the circumstances in which the appellant obtained the passport as irrelevant to reasonable excuse.

2. The court accepted that section 25(1) of the Identity Cards Act 2006 expressly refers to knowledge or belief, whereas section 25(5) does not. Accordingly, an honest belief that a document is genuine cannot by itself create a defence under section 25(5). There was no basis for implying the knowledge language of section 25(1) into section 25(5).

3. That conclusion did not make the appellant's belief irrelevant. A reasonable-excuse defence requires an objective assessment of the explanation for possessing the document. The circumstances of acquisition may explain both the belief that it was genuine and why it was not destroyed or handed to the authorities. A jury may accept the account yet find it unreasonable, or reject the account; but it is entitled to consider it.

4. The question is ordinarily for the jury. Following R v Y(A) [2010] EWCA Crim 762, the judge may withdraw it only where no reasonable jury could find the alleged facts capable of constituting a reasonable excuse.

5. The appellant had adduced sufficient evidence for a jury to consider whether her account provided a reasonable excuse. Her guilty plea followed the erroneous ruling and could not stand. The court therefore quashed the conviction.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.
• Trial judge: Ruled that the appellant's belief that the passport was genuine was irrelevant to reasonable excuse under section 25(5) of the Identity Cards Act 2006. The appellant then pleaded guilty and received a community sentence.