Williams, R v

Previous convictions admitted after a defendant attacks another person’s character may be used only for their permitted credibility purpose. Where similar convictions create a risk that a jury will infer a propensity to commit the charged offence, the judge must give a clear and strong direction that they cannot be used for that purpose. If inadequate directions create a real possibility that the jury were improperly influenced, and the appellate court cannot be satisfied that the error made no difference, the conviction is unsafe.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Snaresbrook of possessing cannabis with intent to supply and possessing criminal property. He alleged that police officers had planted the drugs found at his home.

The prosecution relied on earlier convictions under section 101(1)(g) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, because the allegation attacked the officers’ character. The disputed convictions were three 1993 offences of possessing drugs with intent to supply. The trial judge admitted them and later directed the jury about them with the issue of lies.

The appeal concerned whether the convictions should have been admitted and, in any event, whether the directions sufficiently confined their use to credibility rather than propensity.

1. Appeal allowed; convictions quashed. The court held that the summing-up contained a serious error and that the convictions were unsafe.
2. The 1993 convictions were tendered under gateway (g) because the appellant had attacked the character of police officers. Their permissible relevance was to the comparative credibility of the appellant and those officers. They were not relied on as evidence of a propensity to deal in drugs.
3. The court expressed concern that the admitted simple-possession convictions may already have adequately served that credibility purpose. The 1993 supply convictions added a substantial risk that the jury would reason impermissibly from past drug dealing to current guilt. The court did not finally determine whether their admission should itself have been excluded under section 101(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
4. Even if admission had been proper, the judge had to give a clear and strong direction identifying the limited purpose of the convictions and forbidding their use as propensity evidence. The directions given did neither. By stating only that the earlier convictions did not automatically make the appellant a drug dealer at the later date, and by treating convictions with lies as matters capable of bearing on guilt, the directions left the jury free to make the prohibited propensity inference.
5. The remaining evidence did not remove the risk. The defence had identified evidential discrepancies concerning the searches, seizure records, exhibit packaging and missing records. The jury’s verdict was by a majority. There was therefore a real possibility that the jury had been inappropriately influenced by the 1993 convictions, and the court could not be satisfied that the error had no effect on the outcome.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — allowed the appeal against conviction and quashed both convictions.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook — convicted the appellant by an 11 to 1 majority of possessing cannabis with intent to supply and possessing criminal property.