Greer, R. v

When a suspended sentence is activated, prior remand custody must normally be credited under section 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The activation court may withhold credit only where it would be unjust to allow it.

A belief that the original sentencing court may have allowed for remand time does not establish injustice. Where the original sentencing remarks do not expressly account for the remand period, the activation court must give the appropriate credit.

The applicant received concurrent sentences of detention in a young offender institution for assault occasioning actual bodily harm and burglary. The four-month sentence was suspended for 12 months with a supervision requirement. He had spent 106 days on remand before that sentence was imposed.

After repeated non-compliance with the supervision requirement, the Crown Court activated the suspended sentence in full. The judge declined to credit the remand period because he believed that the original sentencing judge had already taken it into account. The applicant sought permission to appeal against sentence on the issue of remand credit.

1. Permission to appeal was granted and the appeal against sentence was allowed to a limited extent. The court directed that the applicant's 106 days on remand should count as time served under section 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

2. The original sentencing remarks did not expressly allow for the time spent on remand. Although the length of the suspended sentence might have suggested that the period had influenced the sentence, that was not a sufficient basis for treating the remand period as already credited.

3. The court applied the reasoning in R v Mari [2010] EWCA Crim 1143. A suspended sentence is treated as a sentence of imprisonment for section 240 when it is activated. The court activating it must direct remand custody to count unless it considers that doing so would be unjust.

4. The activation judge's assumption about the original sentencing judge's approach could not justify withholding credit. His view that the applicant deserved the full four months did not displace the statutory requirement.

5. The court ordered that 106 days count as time served. If that figure proved inaccurate, it could be corrected administratively through communication with the Registrar.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Granted permission and allowed the appeal against sentence to direct credit for 106 days spent on remand.

• Crown Court: The applicant received a four-month suspended sentence. Following breaches of its supervision requirement, the sentence was activated in full without credit for the earlier remand period.