Hall v R.

In a fresh-evidence appeal, the court must decide for itself whether the conviction is unsafe. It must evaluate the reliability and importance of the evidence against the trial evidence as a whole. The possible effect on the jury is a useful cross-check in a difficult case, but it is not the ultimate question.

Under Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the court may exceptionally receive relevant expert evidence in the interests of justice, even if aspects of conventional analysis could have been explored at trial. Fresh scientific criticism will not render a conviction unsafe where the court rejects its underlying premise and concludes that the remaining scientific evidence remains compelling.

The appellant was convicted of murder at Norwich Crown Court in 2003 and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 16-year minimum term. A renewed application for leave to appeal was refused in 2004.

Following a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the appellant appealed on the basis of new expert evidence concerning forensic fibre comparisons. The proposed evidence used first-derivative analysis of microspectrophotometry spectra and contended that fibres recovered at the crime scene were distinguishable from fibres found at locations associated with the appellant.

The central issues were whether the expert evidence should be received and, if so, whether it rendered the conviction unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court was satisfied that the conviction remained safe.

2. The court received the expert evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. Although conventional fibre analysis could have been challenged at trial, the scientific examination had been incomplete in ways unknown to the defence. It was therefore in the interests of justice to admit the evidence for its full effect.

3. Applying Pendleton [2002] 1 WLR 72, Stafford v DPP [1978] AC 878, Dial v State of Trinidad and Tobago [2005] UKPC 4 and R v Hakala [2002] EWCA Crim 730, the court held that it had to assess the fresh evidence itself in the context of all the evidence. The question was the safety of the conviction, not whether the appellant was guilty. In a difficult case, the likely effect upon the trial jury may assist as a cross-check, but the appellate court retains responsibility for the decision.

4. The evidence of all three experts was capable of belief, but the court rejected Mr Coyle’s conclusion that the fibre populations were distinguishable. In the absence of a donor garment, the proper task was to identify the intra-fibre and inter-fibre range within each population before comparing them. The first-derivative technique had magnified variations that occurred within both populations and had produced a false exclusion. The court accepted the evidence of Mr Palmer and Mr Robson that the relevant variations were congruent and that the two fibre populations could be associated.

5. The trial presentation had incompletely described the range of fibre variation, and the polyester fibres had been wrongly described as green rather than carbon black. Those matters did not undermine the conclusion that the scientific evidence associating the appellant with the crime-scene fibres was compelling. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Following a Criminal Cases Review Commission reference, the court received fresh expert evidence and dismissed the appeal against conviction.
• Full Court of the Court of Appeal A renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused on 22 April 2004.
• Norwich Crown Court The appellant was convicted of murder on 28 February 2003 and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 16 years.