Messent, R. v

Fact-specific sentencing decisions may provide broad assistance but do not bind a sentencing judge unless they are guideline authorities. A judge is not normally required to address each such decision individually in sentencing remarks.

Foreign corruption does not attract reduced culpability merely because it is characterised as commercial. Where corrupt payments involve state-controlled bodies, government-appointed employees and state funds, the distinction between commercial and political corruption may be immaterial. Deliberate corruption causing serious public and economic harm warrants a substantial custodial sentence.

The appellant, formerly a senior employee of London reinsurance brokers, pleaded guilty at Southwark Crown Court to two corruption offences. Thirty-nine further corruption offences were taken into consideration.

He had overseen corrupt payments connected with Costa Rican state-owned institutions. The arrangements helped retain valuable brokerage contracts, increased his bonus, and caused losses ultimately borne from Costa Rican state funds.

On 26 October 2010 he received concurrent sentences of 21 months’ imprisonment, a five-year disqualification under section 2 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, and a compensation order of £100,000. He appealed against sentence, contending principally that the judge’s starting point was excessive and that the corruption was commercial rather than political.

1. Appeal dismissed. The concurrent sentences of 21 months’ imprisonment were not manifestly excessive and were not open to criticism.

2. Fact-specific sentencing decisions may offer broad assistance, but they are not binding unless they are guideline authorities. A sentencing judge is not normally required to address every such authority individually or explain why each does or does not assist.

3. The court accepted the observation in R v Innospec Limited that corruption of foreign government officials or ministers is at the top end of serious corporate offending. It held, however, that the gravest corporate offending in this area is not confined to that description. Deliberate and intentional corruption causes serious harm, including harm to public institutions, markets and public services.

4. On the facts, the suggested distinction between commercial and political corruption was without difference. The recipients were connected with state-owned bodies, their senior personnel were government-appointed, and the premiums and ultimate loss came from Costa Rican state funds. The appellant’s culpability was therefore not reduced by describing the arrangements as commercial.

5. The sentencing judge had properly assessed the sustained and substantial corrupt payments, the dishonest mechanism by which they were recovered, the appellant’s financial benefit, the mitigation, delay, eventual co-operation and guilty plea. A starting point of four to five years’ imprisonment was within the appropriate range, and the resulting sentence reflected full mitigation.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): appeal against sentence dismissed.
• Crown Court at Southwark: the appellant pleaded guilty to two corruption offences on 22 October 2010. On 26 October 2010 he received concurrent sentences of 21 months’ imprisonment, a five-year disqualification under section 2 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, and a compensation order.