Crown Prosecution Service v Winchester Crown Court

When deciding whether to extend a custody time limit, the court must be satisfied that the statutory conditions are met, including that the prosecution has acted with all due diligence and expedition. That obligation is not confined to technical case preparation. Where a foreseeable listing or venue problem may delay the trial, the prosecution may be expected to raise it promptly, while the court remains the ultimate arbiter of listing. Judicial review does not permit the reviewing court to substitute its own assessment for that of the trial judge. It intervenes only on familiar public-law grounds, including irrationality or a material irrelevant consideration. The custody-time-limit period is a maximum, not a target, and the defendant’s liberty and Article 5 rights remain relevant.

The Crown Prosecution Service sought permission to apply for judicial review of HHJ Boney QC’s refusal to extend the custody time limits of six defendants awaiting trial on serious and complex drug-importation charges. The trial had initially been listed at Portsmouth, but the venue was later changed to Winchester. The change meant that the trial could not begin before the custody time limits expired. HHJ Boney concluded that the prosecution had failed to act with due diligence and expedition because it had not challenged the earlier venue decision promptly. The central issue was whether that conclusion was open to challenge on judicial-review grounds.

The court granted permission to apply for judicial review because the point was arguable, but dismissed the claim on its merits.

1. Under section 22(3) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, an extension could be granted only if the need for it resulted from good or sufficient cause and the prosecution had acted with all due diligence and expedition. The applicable custody period was a maximum, not a target.
2. The guidance in McDonald and others [1998] EWHC 319 (Admin) required diligence and expedition appropriate to the circumstances. Relevant matters included the preparation required, the conduct of the defence, dependence on others, and other matters genuinely bearing on preparation. The prosecution need not show that every step was taken as quickly as humanly possible.
3. The duty was not limited to preparing evidence and documents. Although the court was the ultimate arbiter of listing and venue, all parties could make submissions on those matters. A prosecutor who perceived that an inappropriate listing decision might cause substantial delay could be expected to challenge it promptly. The principle was supported by R v Worcester Crown Court (14 December 1999).
4. HHJ Boney was entitled to treat the prosecution’s delay in challenging the venue as relevant to due diligence and expedition. His conclusion was reached after full argument and careful consideration of the evidence. It was not shown to be irrational or to involve a material irrelevant consideration.
5. The reviewing court’s function was supervisory. It could not substitute its own view on whether an extension should have been granted. The defendants’ liberty and their rights under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights formed part of the background.

The application was dismissed. The defendants were consequently entitled to release, subject to the agreed bail conditions and the prison being informed.

The judgment itself records no prior appellate decision. It concerned judicial review of HHJ Boney QC’s decision refusing to extend the custody time limits.