Hassan v Secretary of State for Justice

Continued segregation of a prisoner under Prison Rule 45 is lawful where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the prisoner’s behaviour remains sufficiently disruptive to make ordinary location unsafe. The duration of segregation is assessed under Wednesbury principles, subject to the requirement that it lasts no longer than the shortest period consistent with the original reasons for separation. Governors and review boards are entitled to substantial respect for their operational expertise, particularly where safety and prison discipline are engaged. Compliance with procedural safeguards does not require legal representation at review boards if the prisoner knows the reasons for segregation, has behaviour targets, can attend reviews and can communicate with monitoring bodies and advisers. A properly administered segregation regime will not breach Articles 3 or 8 merely because segregation is distressing or the prisoner has a history of mental ill-health.

The claimant, a serving prisoner at HMP Full Sutton, challenged his segregation from 18 February to 12 April 2010. He alleged that continued segregation lacked justification under Prison Rules 1999 and Prison Service Order 1700, breached Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and failed to observe procedural safeguards, particularly those relating to mental health and reasons for segregation.

The segregation followed a suspected assault on another prisoner and later concerted damage to cells and intimidation of staff. Review boards repeatedly authorised continuation, while healthcare staff recorded no significant deterioration or self-harm concerns. The central issues were whether segregation should have ended earlier, whether the regime or its effects breached Convention rights, and whether the procedural protections were adequate.

1. Lawfulness and duration. The claim was dismissed. The initial segregation was rationally justified by the claimant’s violent and disruptive prison history and reasonable evidence linking him to an assault. The absence of a charge or adjudication did not remove the evidential value of that material.

2. Whether segregation should continue was reviewable under Wednesbury principles. Prison Service Order 1700 required segregation to last no longer than the shortest period consistent with the original reasons, but the duration of compliance required before return to ordinary location was primarily a matter for the Governor and review board. Their operational expertise and knowledge of prison safety warranted respect. The subsequent destruction of cell fixtures, concerted disorder and intimidation of staff were legitimate additional reasons for continued segregation. Continuation was not punishment for those events, but part of assessing whether the claimant could safely return to ordinary location.

3. The repeated reference to the original suspected assault in the written reasons was imperfect but did not invalidate the decisions. The claimant knew of the assault allegation, the later disorder, and the behavioural targets he had to meet. The period of just over seven weeks was not disproportionate or unlawful in the circumstances.

4. The regime did not reach the threshold of Article 3 and did not interfere with Article 8 sufficiently to require justification. In any event, the segregation was justified by good order and discipline. The evidence showed daily healthcare and other visits, review-board consideration of mental health, regular exercise and showers, access to visits, calls, reading material and legal advisers, and no significant adverse mental-health effect attributable to the period in question.

5. Procedural safeguards formed part of the protection afforded to segregated prisoners, but no Rule or requirement of Prison Service Order 1700 was breached. Legal representation at review boards was unnecessary. A care plan on release, if absent, did not itself engage Convention rights or retrospectively render the segregation unlawful.

This was a first-instance judicial review claim in the Administrative Court. Permission was granted on the challenge to the duration and justification of segregation, while permission was refused on a distinct access-to-justice ground. The claim was dismissed.