Forrest v Lord Chancellor & Anor

A coroner’s judicial independence protects decisions and the performance of judicial functions from local-authority control. It does not give the coroner exclusive managerial authority over administrative staff employed by the local authority. The authority may exercise appropriate employment and management powers, provided that they are exercised consistently with the coroner’s independence and do not prevent the proper administration of the coronial service. The authority must fund the coroner’s office, but expenses are not wholly within the coroner’s discretion and must be reasonable and properly accounted for. A disagreement about staff management or expenditure does not justify unreasonable or intemperate conduct. The defendants’ decision to remove the coroner was therefore not legally flawed.

The claimant, a coroner for the Avon district and also an Immigration Judge, sought permission to judicially review the decisions of the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice to remove him from his coronial office. The decision followed investigations into his conduct towards Bristol City Council, which employed and funded his administrative staff.

The principal issue was whether the claimant’s judicial independence gave him exclusive control over those staff and over expenditure relating to the coronial service. A subsidiary issue concerned whether particular expenses were recoverable under the Coroners Act 1988. The court also considered the legal significance of the staff’s transfer to the Council under TUPE.

1. Judicial independence. The coroner is a judge. Bristol City Council, or any other body, could not interfere with the claimant’s judicial decisions or with how he reached them. Nor could it lawfully exercise its powers so as to prevent the proper administration of the coronial service.
2. Employment and management of staff. The claimant’s administrative staff transferred to Bristol City Council in July 2004 under TUPE. As employer, the Council consequently had appropriate powers of control and direction. Those powers had to be exercised consistently with the claimant’s judicial independence and proper freedom of action. That constitutional protection did not require the claimant to have all-embracing authority over staff employed by the Council.
3. Funding and expenditure. The Council was required to meet the expenses of the coroner’s office, but the obligation was not open-ended. The statutory provisions in ss 24–28 of the Coroners Act 1988 imposed controls on fees and expenses. The claimant accepted that expenditure had to be reasonable and properly accounted for.
4. The historic statutory material relied upon by the claimant did not establish exclusive powers over staff. If an extreme disagreement about expenditure or staff directions could not be resolved, the High Court would be the ultimate arbiter, probably through judicial review. That possibility did not justify the claimant’s high-handed conduct or his absolute view of his powers.
5. The challenge to the conclusions concerning particular recoverable expenses was not substantiated. In any event, those points could not undermine the decision in light of the unchallenged findings concerning the claimant’s conduct. The defendants’ decision was not legally flawed, and the application for permission to seek judicial review was dismissed.

The judgment concerned an adjourned application for permission to seek judicial review. No separate lower-court decision is stated in the judgment.