Trigger v Northampton Magistrates Court

A magistrates’ court’s power under section 142 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 is not confined to correcting clerical slips, but it remains a relatively limited jurisdiction. It may be used to replace an invalid sentence with one that could lawfully have been imposed at the original sentencing date. It cannot be used as a substitute for breach proceedings or an application under the statutory provisions governing variation or revocation of a suspended sentence order. Any increase in sentence must ordinarily be made speedily, having regard to the principle of finality in sentencing. The court must assess the sentence by reference to the circumstances existing at the original sentencing date and must disregard later, irrelevant matters.

The claimant sought judicial review of decisions made by Northampton Magistrates’ Court on 19 and 29 October 2010. The magistrates had used section 142 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 to impose eight weeks’ immediate imprisonment in place of a suspended sentence order made in February 2009.

The original order was unlawful because its operational and supervision periods exceeded the statutory maximum. The magistrates later purported to reopen the matter after concerns arose about the claimant’s compliance with a programme requirement and his continuing risk. The central issues were whether section 142 authorised that course, whether it could be used 20 months after sentence, and whether the October decisions were lawfully made.

1. The court had already granted permission and quashed the sentences. The decisions of 19 and 29 October 2010 were unlawful.

2. Section 142 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 confers a wide power to vary or rescind a sentence where it is in the interests of justice. Its use is not restricted exclusively to clerical slips, and there is no express statutory time limit. However, the jurisdiction remains relatively limited and must be exercised consistently with the principle of finality in sentencing.

3. The section permits the court to impose a sentence which could have been imposed at the original sentencing date. It does not permit the court, under the guise of correcting a mistake, to take account of later non-compliance or later developments which are irrelevant to the sentence that should originally have been imposed. The proper question was what sentence would have been imposed on 25 February 2009 had the court known that the programme lasted three years and that the supervision period could not exceed two years.

4. Section 142 could not be used as a substitute for breach proceedings under Part 2 of Schedule 12 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, or for an application under Part 3 of that Schedule to revoke a programme requirement. The magistrates had impermissibly relied on alleged failures to comply with the programme requirement without following those statutory procedures.

5. The power to increase a sentence should ordinarily be exercised speedily after the original sentence. Imposing immediate custody 20 months after the suspended sentence, without proper regard to finality, was inappropriate. The sentence imposed on 19 October was independently unlawful because the claimant was unrepresented, contrary to section 83 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

Not stated in the judgment. This was a judicial review claim determined at first instance by the Administrative Court.