C v A Local Authority

For a person lacking capacity, confinement in a restricted space for more than a negligible period, without valid consent and with State responsibility, constitutes a deprivation of liberty under article 5 ECHR. A public authority or residential school cannot authorise such detention unless empowered by statute or court order.

Seclusion must be an emergency, last-resort measure used only to contain serious risk of harm to others. It must be proportionate, necessary, least restrictive, individually planned, recorded, monitored and reviewed. It must not be punishment, therapy, behaviour modification, or a response solely to nakedness or self-harm.

Best-interests decision-making requires an objective evaluation of all relevant circumstances, including the person’s wishes and feelings and less restrictive alternatives.

The proceedings concerned an incapacitated young man with severe autism, learning disabilities and challenging behaviour. They combined a judicial review claim against a local authority with Court of Protection proceedings about his care, transition to adulthood, residence and possible deprivation of liberty.

The local authority accepted that C’s pathway plan and adult transition arrangements had been inadequate. It also accepted that seclusion and restraint in the blue room constituted a deprivation of liberty which required legal authorisation. The court had to determine the statutory framework, the applicable guidance, the proper approach to best interests, and the safeguards governing C’s continued care pending a planned move to a specialist healthcare placement.

1. Deprivation of liberty. The court applied the three requirements for an article 5 deprivation of liberty: confinement in a restricted space for more than a negligible period; absence of valid consent because C lacked capacity; and responsibility attributable to the State. C’s general living arrangements and his confinement in the blue room met those requirements. The local authority and school had no power to authorise the deprivation. From C’s sixteenth birthday, authorisation could and should have been sought from the Court of Protection. The unauthorised deprivation was unlawful and breached article 5 ECHR.
2. Statutory schemes. The local authority had failed to comply with its duties under the Children Act 1989, the Children (Leaving Care) Act 2000 and the Children (Leaving Care) (England) Regulations 2001 to assess C’s needs, prepare a sufficiently detailed pathway plan and provide the required continuing support. The pathway plan had to be completed even if the authority considered another form of care planning appropriate.
3. Mental health guidance. Although the deprivation of liberty safeguards in Schedule A1 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 did not apply because the school was a children’s home rather than a hospital or care home, the Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice applied as a matter of law and good practice to C’s care, seclusion and restraint. Professionals had to have regard to the Code and explain and record any departure from it.
4. Best interests. The court had to make an objective value judgment after considering all relevant circumstances, facilitating participation where practicable, taking account of wishes, feelings, beliefs and values, consulting relevant persons, and considering less restrictive alternatives. The least restrictive option did not automatically prevail if another option was in C’s best interests. Sensible risk appraisal was required rather than avoidance of every risk.
5. Seclusion. The blue room could be used only within a written, C-specific intervention and prevention plan. Its use had to be necessary, proportionate, least restrictive, continuously observable and monitored, and for the shortest time necessary. It could not be used as punishment, therapy, behaviour modification, solely because C was naked, or solely to manage self-injury unless it was the only immediate means of protecting him while staff attempted to reduce that risk. Voluntary use was permissible only if C remained free to leave.
6. Nakedness and care arrangements. Seclusion solely because C was naked was wholly unacceptable. His sensory needs and autonomy had to be accommodated through less restrictive arrangements, including access to appropriate parts of his accommodation while naked. Sharing accommodation with A was not in C’s best interests, but an immediate move was more harmful than maintaining the interim position until the planned specialist placement.
7. Relief. The court approved the agreed dedicated healthcare placement and the revised care, pathway, behaviour-support and seclusion arrangements. The remaining historical article 3 and article 8 allegations and damages claims were adjourned for a later hearing. The interim arrangements were authorised only within the defined procedures and constraints.

This was a first-instance judgment in concurrent judicial review and Court of Protection proceedings. The court recorded that the parties had compromised most remedies against the local authority. Historical human-rights allegations and damages claims were adjourned for further hearing.