Mereworth v Ministry of Justice

The ordinary courts have no jurisdiction to determine whether a person is entitled to sit and vote in either House of Parliament, including where entitlement depends on statute. Such questions fall within Parliament’s exclusive cognisance unless legislation confers jurisdiction on a specially designated court. Section 1 of the House of Lords Act 1999 removed the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote, and therefore removed the associated right to receive a Writ of Summons. It did not repeal the Letters Patent or abolish the dignity of the peerage. Rights connected with participation in the House of Lords are public, rather than civil, private or proprietary rights for the purposes of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of the First Protocol.

The claimant, the present Lord Mereworth, succeeded to a hereditary barony created by Letters Patent in 1926. He sought declarations that the Letters Patent entitled him to a seat and voice in the House of Lords and to receive a Writ of Summons. He also sought a declaration that the court had jurisdiction to interpret the House of Lords Act 1999 and determine whether it had repealed the Letters Patent.

The Crown Office contended that the issues fell within Parliament’s exclusive cognisance and, alternatively, that section 1 of the 1999 Act had removed the relevant right. The central issues were the court’s jurisdiction, the effect of section 1, and the claimant’s reliance on Convention rights.

1. Jurisdiction. The claim was struck out. The ordinary civil courts have no jurisdiction to decide whether a person is entitled to sit and vote in either House of Parliament. Questions concerning membership and entitlement to a Writ of Summons fall within Parliament’s exclusive cognisance, subject to any statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on a specially designated court. The principle applies even when entitlement depends on an Act of Parliament. The court applied the reasoning in R v Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52 and Bradlaugh v Gosset [1884] 12 QBD 271.
2. The Committee for Privileges of the House of Lords had jurisdiction to determine entitlement to a Writ of Summons. The claimant’s remedy, if he considered that a writ had been improperly withheld, was to petition the House. The historical decisions concerning Viscountess Rhondda and the Wensleydale peerage illustrated that position.
3. Effect of the 1999 Act. Before the Act, the right to a Writ of Summons arose in virtue of the peerage. Section 1 provided that no one should be a member of the House of Lords by virtue of a hereditary peerage. The repeated phrase “by virtue of” showed that the provision removed the right to receive a writ, and consequently the right to sit and vote. It did not remove the dignity of the peerage or repeal the Letters Patent.
4. Convention rights. Participation in the work of the House of Lords was a public-law right outside Article 6, and the right to receive a writ was merely a precursor to that public right. The same reasoning excluded Article 8. The right to sit and vote by virtue of hereditary peerage was not a possession for the purposes of Article 1 of the First Protocol. In any event, the claimant succeeded after the 1999 Act, so no existing right had been taken away.
5. Even if jurisdiction existed, the claim was bound to fail on its merits. No trial was necessary, and the claim was struck out.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.