Kerr, R (On the Application Of) v Cambridge City Council (Rev 1)

A planning decision may be quashed for procedural unfairness where an objector is wrongly prevented from addressing the committee and the error causes substantial prejudice. The court must assess the whole decision-making process, including the accuracy of the officer’s report, the treatment of speakers and the matters actually considered by the committee. An objector need not be confined to points already made in written representations. The relevant period for promptness under CPR 54.5(1) runs from promulgation of the decision, rather than the committee meeting, although the claim must still be brought promptly. A planning application describing use as a community house was not unlawful merely because the objector characterised the use as a mosque.

The claimant, a resident living opposite 107 Darwin Drive, sought judicial review of Cambridge City Council’s grant of full planning permission for an extension to premises used as a Bangladeshi Community House. He alleged that the application misdescribed the use, that the planning committee had acted with procedural unfairness, and that its members were biased. The Council accepted that he had wrongly been prevented from speaking but argued that he had suffered no prejudice and that the claim was not prompt. Following a rolled-up hearing, the court considered whether the permission should be quashed.

1. Promptness. The claim was filed within the three-month period and promptly for the purposes of CPR 54.5(1). The relevant date was 10 December 2009, when the permission was promulgated, rather than 12 November 2009, when the committee voted. The claimant reasonably needed to obtain the minutes and planning documents, assess the grounds and prepare the claim. A period of about three to four weeks after obtaining the necessary material was reasonable.
2. Procedural unfairness and prejudice. The decision-making process contained four connected errors: the officer’s report incompletely summarised the objections; the claimant was wrongly prevented from speaking; an unauthorised supporter of the application was allowed to address the committee while being mistaken for a residents’ representative; and the committee did not consider material objections. Those objections concerned prior breaches of use restrictions, likely further intensification, the applicant’s failure to produce or comply with a management plan, and whether permission should be deferred until a robust plan had been agreed.
3. The claimant’s oral opportunity was materially important. He could have developed any relevant planning point, not merely matters in his written representations. The committee’s mistaken assumptions deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to place the omitted matters before it. The errors caused significant prejudice, so the permission was quashed.
4. The misdescription ground failed. The use described as a Community House involved local community gatherings, prayer, religious and cultural instruction and meetings. It was not, on the facts found, use as a mosque. The bias ground also failed because the matters relied upon did not establish actual or apparent bias.
5. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted. Planning permission reference 09/0731/Ful was quashed. The claimant, acting in person, was awarded costs summarily assessed at £3,750.