Alistairs Solicitors, R (on the application of) v Exeter Crown Court

Permission to seek judicial review of a Crown Court refusal to list a central-funds costs hearing may be arguable where the applicant says it was denied a proper opportunity to make submissions. A legal representative seeking review in its own name may face a distinct standing problem, even though the courts adopt a generous approach to standing in public law. A challenge based on an alleged factual mistake requires evidence that the decision was in fact founded on that mistake. Complaints directed principally at earlier magistrates’ court proceedings do not, without more, make the Crown Court’s case-management decision Wednesbury unreasonable.

Alistairs Solicitors, acting for Adrian Shaw, renewed an application for permission to challenge the Exeter Crown Court’s refusal to list a hearing concerning an order for costs from central funds following Mr Shaw’s partly successful appeal against convictions. The proposed grounds were that no proper opportunity had been given to make submissions on costs, that the Crown Court had proceeded on a mistake of fact about the appeal’s outcome, and that its decision was Wednesbury unreasonable.

The Administrative Court considered arguability and also identified whether the solicitor’s firm, rather than the client, had standing to bring the claim.

1. Permission and arguability. The renewed application was arguable on the ground that the claimant had not been given a proper opportunity to make submissions on costs. The application had initially appeared to be motivated by criticisms of the magistrates’ court, but it was refocused at the hearing.
2. Alleged mistake of fact. Permission was not refused on the second ground, but the court observed that the Crown Court’s reference to the client losing the principal appeal did not clearly establish that the decision rested on a mistake. The Crown Court may have regarded the mobile-phone conviction as the principal matter, while recognising that other appeals had succeeded.
3. Standing. The appeal had been brought by Mr Shaw, whereas the judicial review claim was brought by his solicitors. Although public law adopts a generous approach to standing, that approach has limits where a legal representative pursues review proceedings instead of the person concerned. R v Legal Aid Board ex parte Bateman [1992] 1 WLR 711, particularly page 717, was relevant to that issue. Standing was reserved for determination at the full hearing.
4. Wednesbury ground. The court did not refuse permission on the additional ground at that stage, but considered it fragile. A freestanding challenge was not arguably Wednesbury unreasonable where it mainly concerned complaints about the magistrates’ court and the Crown Court judge’s case-management decision concerning costs from public funds.
5. Further procedure. A transcript of R v Legal Aid Board ex parte Bateman was to be obtained for the full hearing. The matter was to be heard by a High Court judge and listed in the ordinary way at the Civil Justice Centre.

This was a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. Permission had previously been refused on the papers by Hickinbottom J, subject to the issues identified in that decision. The matter was directed to a full hearing before a High Court judge.