McKeown v Attheraces Ltd

At the interlocutory stage of a libel claim, a defendant could not obtain strike-out or summary judgment merely because the publication reported findings of a sporting disciplinary body. A jury could find that broadcast comments adopted those findings as the broadcaster’s own assertions, defeating statutory qualified privilege. Whether comments were honest opinion also could not be determined where intention and the underlying conduct remained disputed facts. Earlier disciplinary findings did not make the libel action an abuse of process where the proceedings involved different issues, including allegations of dishonesty and motive, and Parliament had provided only qualified privilege and rebuttable evidential presumptions in the relevant statutory schemes. The claim therefore remained suitable for trial, and a stay pending possible reopening of the disciplinary proceedings was refused.

Dean McKeown, a jockey, sued Attheraces Ltd over a television interview concerning a race in which he had ridden. The interview referred to findings by British Horseracing Authority disciplinary bodies that he had breached Rule 157 and had previously been found guilty of related misconduct. The pleaded meanings included deliberately stopping a horse, cheating the racing public and acting pursuant to a corrupt bargain.

The defendant applied to strike out or obtain summary judgment under CPR 3.4(2) and CPR 24.2. It relied on statutory qualified privilege, honest comment, justification, abuse of process based on prior disciplinary and judicial proceedings, lack of a reputation worth vindicating, and alternatively a stay pending possible reopening of the disciplinary proceedings.

1. Statutory qualified privilege. The court assumed that the words were capable of bearing the pleaded defamatory meanings. Under the Defamation Act 1996, not every part of a publication must itself be a report. However, a jury could find that the broadcaster had adopted the disciplinary findings as his own assertions, or had made the report unfair by intermingling extraneous material. The broadcast format also required consideration of tone, body language and the reasonable viewer’s understanding. The defence could not therefore be determined summarily.
2. Honest comment. The question whether the claimant intentionally failed to ride his horse on its merits was a question of fact, notwithstanding that intention and motive are states of mind. The defendant’s argument that the allegations were necessarily opinion was not bound to succeed. Disputed facts meant that the defence could not be resolved at this stage.
3. Re-litigation abuse. The principle against collateral attacks on final decisions applied in appropriate circumstances to disciplinary proceedings. But the status of the Stewards’ enquiry was uncertain, the proceedings before Stadlen J had principally involved review rather than determination of the merits, and fresh video evidence was available. The pleaded meanings also went beyond the matters decided by the disciplinary bodies, particularly by alleging dishonesty and motive. The court could not conclude that the claimant’s possible application to reopen the disciplinary proceedings was doomed, or that allowing the libel action to proceed would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
4. Vindication and stay. The claimant had a real prospect of obtaining valuable vindication, including by defeating justification. The action was not shown to lack real or substantial significance. A stay was refused because the outcome of any reopening application was uncertain and the claim included the Rascal in the Mix race, which had not been the subject of the earlier dishonesty findings.
5. The defendant was given permission to amend its Defence. Its other applications were dismissed.

First-instance interlocutory decision. The judgment refers to earlier British Horseracing Authority proceedings and to a prior High Court judgment by Stadlen J, but the present proceedings were not an appeal from that decision.