Sheikh v Beaumont

A general civil restraint order may be extended where the criteria for making the original order remain satisfied. The relevant conduct is persistence in issuing claims or making applications that are totally without merit, in circumstances where a further civil restraint order is appropriate. The court may extend the order for no more than two years on any one occasion under Practice Direction 3C. The court should determine only whether the extension criteria are met and should not use the application to reopen issues decided by other judges.

A general civil restraint order had been made against the claimant for two years. The Bar Mutual Indemnity Fund applied for a further two-year extension, contending that the claimant remained likely to issue vexatious and unfounded proceedings. The application relied on subsequent proceedings and conduct, including findings in Sheikh v Dogan and other proceedings that claims or applications were totally without merit or an abuse of process. The claimant sought to revisit earlier decisions and to exclude proposed county court applications from the order.

The central issue was whether the criteria for extending the order were satisfied.

1. Extension criteria. Under para 4.10 of Practice Direction 3C, the court may extend a general civil restraint order if appropriate, but not for more than two years on any one occasion.
2. The criteria for extension must be similar to those for making the original order. Under para 4.1, the relevant circumstances are persistence in issuing claims or making applications that are totally without merit, where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate.
3. The claimant’s conduct before the court, together with the conduct recorded by Norris J in Sheikh v Dogan, demonstrated a continuing need for restraint. The court was entitled to take account of repeated applications, lengthy submissions and attempts to pursue matters that had already been determined.
4. The application was limited to continuation of the restraint order. It was not an occasion to reopen earlier decisions or to grant permission for proposed applications where no proper basis had been shown.
5. The general civil restraint order was extended for a further two years. Permission was not granted for the proposed applications to be made outside the order.

The judgment was a first-instance decision on an application to extend a general civil restraint order. The judgment records that permission to appeal against the original order had previously been refused as totally without merit, but this court was deciding the separate extension application.