Loader v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

Whether a project is likely to have significant effects on the environment is a fact-sensitive judgment for the expert planning decision-maker. The expression has no single, hard-edged meaning suitable for every case. The broad scope and purpose of the EIA Directive do not justify replacing the statutory test with the lower question whether an effect is relevant to, or might influence, the development-consent decision. Screening decisions remain reviewable on ordinary public-law grounds.

A negative screening decision need not contain elaborate reasons. It must show that the environmental issues were understood and considered, and give interested persons sufficient information to understand the decision and protect their rights. Mitigation measures may be taken into account, particularly where their operation is governed by a familiar regulatory regime.

The claimant sought judicial review of a screening direction made by the Secretary of State under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999. The proposed redevelopment of a former bowls club included sheltered apartments, leisure facilities, parking and a new bowls green.

The Secretary of State concluded that the Schedule 2 development was not likely to have significant effects on the environment and therefore did not require an environmental impact assessment. The claimant argued that the wrong test of significance had been applied and that the reasons were inadequate, particularly concerning asbestos removal and mitigation measures. The central issues were the meaning of “significant effects on the environment” and the sufficiency of the reasons for the negative screening direction.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The phrase “significant effects on the environment” in article 2(1) of the EIA Directive and the 1999 Regulations is not equivalent to an environmental effect important enough to influence the development-consent decision. That approach would impose a substantially lower threshold and could require an EIA in almost every case involving some environmental effect.
2. The Directive’s wide scope and broad purpose support a purposive interpretation of the types of project within its scope. They do not permit the court to recast the distinct question whether the effects of a particular project are likely to be significant. That question is pre-eminently one of expert judgment, informed by local conditions and the nature, size and location of the development. It is reviewable on Wednesbury grounds, but is not a question of hard fact requiring one universally correct answer.
3. No single defined test can be laid down for significance. The assessment must be undertaken case by case, with the screening criteria and relevant guidance used as aids rather than substitutes for judgment.
4. Ground 2 dismissed. A screening decision may take account of mitigation measures. Reasons need not be elaborate, but must demonstrate that the issues were understood and considered, and provide enough information for interested parties to understand the basis of the decision and decide whether to challenge it. Reasons may be read with the surrounding correspondence.
5. The reference to mitigating schemes for asbestos removal was sufficient in context. The correspondence identified compliance with environmental standards, and the familiar regulatory regime made it unnecessary to set out chapter and verse of the applicable provisions. The claim was dismissed. A reference to the Court of Justice was refused.