Secretary of State for the Home Department v CD

On a review of a control order, the court must determine whether the Secretary of State’s decisions were flawed by applying judicial-review principles. The controlee must receive sufficient information about the essence of the allegations to give effective instructions and refute them where possible. Detailed evidence and sources need not be disclosed where that requirement is met. The court must assess whether the material establishes reasonable grounds for suspicion, while recognising that this is distinct from proof to a specified standard. Necessity and each individual obligation require proportionality and intense scrutiny. The Secretary of State’s assessment attracts appropriate deference, but the court must consider whether less intrusive measures could achieve the same protection. A failure to know a later, non-material change in circumstances does not necessarily make the decision flawed.

The Secretary of State imposed a non-derogating control order on CD under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The order imposed extensive restrictions, including relocation from London to the Midlands, a curfew, reporting duties and restrictions on association and communications. CD challenged the order at a section 3(10) hearing.

The issues were whether CD had sufficient information to give effective instructions under article 6, whether there were reasonable grounds for suspecting his involvement in terrorism-related activity, and whether the order and each obligation remained necessary and proportionate for public protection.

1. Article 6. The open allegations, including alleged extremist training in Syria and use of internet cafés to access extremist literature, conveyed their essence sufficiently to enable CD to give effective instructions and refute them where possible. The court also considered whether disclosure arising during the hearings was essential to fairness and concluded that it was not.
2. Reasonable grounds. The fact that the CPS considered there was insufficient admissible evidence to charge CD with a terrorism offence did not undermine the control-order decision. The statutory scheme operated where there was no realistic prospect of successful prosecution. The court had to consider all open and closed material and determine whether the evidential matrix amounted to reasonable grounds for suspicion. The absence of evidential detail from the open statement resulted from the permitted open and closed procedure and did not establish that no sustainable evidential basis existed.
3. The Secretary of State’s possible lack of knowledge that an associate had moved from London to Lancashire did not make the decision flawed. In context, the information was not material, and the Secretary of State subsequently confirmed that it would not have altered her decision. Similarly, the detention of one alleged firearms contact did not materially reduce the significance of the alleged attempts to procure firearms.
4. Necessity and proportionality. The control order remained necessary to disrupt the network and reduce CD’s ability to engage in terrorism-related activity. Each obligation required separate and intense scrutiny. The substantial interference with family and private life was proportionate to the public-protection objective. Deference was owed to the Secretary of State, who was better placed to assess protective measures, but particularly onerous obligations required consideration of alternative means.
5. The relocation obligation, curfew, dual daily-reporting requirements and remaining obligations were necessary and proportionate. The challenge to the control order therefore failed.

The judgment records that Mitting J granted permission for the control order and made an anonymity order. Simon J later dismissed CD’s appeal against relocation to the Midlands. The present court independently reviewed the continuing control order and dismissed the challenge.