Mitton & Ors v Benefield & Anor

Harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 requires conduct sufficiently grave to justify criminal sanctions. The Act is not intended to regulate the ordinary irritations and friction of close communal living. A course of conduct may nevertheless cross the threshold where persistent allegations, complaints and communications are pursued obsessively and the respondent knows, or ought to know, that they amount to harassment. The statutory exceptions for conduct pursued to prevent or detect crime, under an enactment, or which is reasonable in the circumstances must be established on the evidence. Where harassment is proved, civil remedies may include general damages, recoverable consequential loss and an appropriately practicable injunction.

The claimants and defendants were neighbours in a residential cul-de-sac. Their friendship deteriorated, and each side alleged harassment by the other under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

The claimants alleged that the defendants had pursued a campaign intended to drive them from their home and damage their business. The defendants denied that allegation and counterclaimed, relying on the claimants’ conduct, including repeated allegations to neighbours and the police. The central issues were whether either course of conduct amounted to harassment, whether any statutory exception applied, and what remedies followed.

1. The claim failed in all respects. The counterclaim succeeded against the first claimant but failed against the second claimant.

2. The court adopted the approach in Conn v Sunderland City Council [2007] EWCA Civ 1492, drawing on Majrowski v Guy’s & St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34. Harassment requires conduct of such gravity as to justify the sanctions of the criminal law. Ordinary annoyance, irritation and upset arising from living near others do not suffice. The statutory scheme does not interfere with the ordinary give and take of everyday life (paras [10]–[13]).

3. Under section 1(3) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the alleged harasser may avoid liability by showing that the course of conduct was pursued to prevent or detect crime, under an enactment, or was reasonable in the particular circumstances. The defendants’ conduct, including contacting the police because of genuine concern for children, fell outside harassment. The claimants’ conduct did not fall within any exception (paras [43]–[47], [99]–[100]).

4. The first claimant’s repeated and persistent conduct crossed the criminal threshold. It included threatening and abusive behaviour, communications to neighbours portraying the defendants as dangerous or criminal, and sustained complaints to the police. He knew, or ought to have known, that the conduct amounted to harassment. The second claimant’s agreement with her husband’s witness statement did not establish that his campaign could be attributed to her (paras [98]–[101]).

5. The defendants were entitled to damages for anxiety and for consequential loss of earnings caused by the harassment. General damages of £7,000 were awarded to each defendant, having regard to the guidance in Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2002] EWCA Civ 1871 and Martins v Choughary [2007] EWCA Civ 1379, while treating those guidelines as guidance rather than fixed limits. Loss of earnings was remitted for assessment by a Queen’s Bench Master. The court also directed that a practicable injunction be drawn, preserving necessary access to the courts and police and reasonable indirect communication (paras [105]–[112]).