Knowles-Fitton, R (on the application of) v Craven District Council & Ors

A planning permission must be construed by asking what meaning a reasonable reader would give it, with limited reference to the application and accompanying plans. Where a later permission comprehensively governs the layout and type of development, it may authorise the whole development even if it describes only an additional unit. A claim for judicial review of a planning permission must satisfy both promptness and the three-month limit in CPR 54.5(1). Delay is assessed separately from prejudice. Even where a permission contains a material error, the court may refuse an extension of time where the claimant’s delay is inordinate and inexcusable, and prejudice to the affected landowner outweighs the public interest in correction.

The interested parties obtained outline permission in 2003 for a holiday chalet site comprising eight chalets. Reserved matters approval followed. In 2007 they applied for permission for one additional chalet, submitting a plan showing nine chalets and a revised layout. The resulting permission referred to one chalet in addition to eight previously approved, but did not include the intended restriction against permanent residential occupation.

The council and its leader sought judicial review, contending that the permission authorised only one chalet and should be quashed because of the omitted condition. The interested parties contended that it authorised nine chalets. The court had to determine the permission’s scope and, if appropriate, whether to extend time and grant relief.

1. Interpretation. A planning permission is construed according to the meaning a reasonable reader would give it, rather than as a commercial document. The application and accompanying plans are permissible extrinsic material, although the material available for construction is limited. The references to plural chalets in the conditions were of little significance.
2. The 2007 permission authorised nine chalets. The application expressly sought one additional chalet making nine in total, and the accompanying plan addressed the whole site, including the layout and types of all nine chalets. Treating the 2003 permission as authorising eight chalets and the 2007 permission as authorising only the ninth would produce an artificial attribution inconsistent with the practical and legal effect of the development. A declaration was therefore appropriate to confirm that scope.
3. Delay and remedy. The omission of the intended occupancy condition was a material error, and the ordinary starting point in such a case is that the planning permission should be quashed to maintain the integrity of the planning system: see R (on the application of Gardner) v Harrogate Borough Council [2008] EWHC 2942 (Admin). That starting point remains subject to delay, prejudice and good administration.
4. The requirements of promptness and the three-month limit under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rule 54.5(1), are separate. Promptness has particular force in challenges to planning permissions: see Finn-Kelcey v Milton Keynes Borough Council [2009] Env L R 17. The council’s delay was both inordinate and inexcusable. Its failure to respond promptly, obtain legal advice, authorise proceedings and issue the claim could not be justified by the summer period or the need to identify the claimant.
5. Under section 31(6) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court could refuse relief where it would substantially prejudice the interested parties or be detrimental to good administration. The lost sales, continuing finance costs and planning uncertainty materially prejudiced the interested parties. The council provided no evidence of special harm from permanent occupation on this site. The public interest in correcting the error could not overcome the council’s prolonged and poorly administered delay. The extension of time was refused and the claim for judicial review dismissed.