Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Haigh & Ors

In exceptional circumstances, the court may release information from private children proceedings to correct a materially false public account of the case. Any disclosure must remain proportionate and must preserve the child’s anonymity wherever possible. Court orders protecting confidentiality and anonymity must be obeyed while they remain in force; the remedy for error is appeal or another lawful challenge, not unilateral publication. A judgment based on all the evidence is authoritative, whereas a partisan account is necessarily incomplete. An order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 may be made where repeated or unjustified applications cause a child and family to require respite from litigation. Such an order must remain proportionate and must not prevent reasonable applications being considered.

The local authority sought permission to place material from private care proceedings in the public domain. The application arose after the mother had circulated allegations that the child’s father had sexually abused the child, notwithstanding findings by two judges that the allegations were false and that the child should live with her father. The father and children’s guardian supported disclosure, but the guardian insisted that the child remain anonymous.

The local authority also sought an order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989, restricting further applications by the mother for two years without permission. The court therefore considered the scope of its power to disclose information, the continuing effect of confidentiality and anonymity orders, and whether the proposed restriction on applications was justified and proportionate.

1. Disclosure and confidentiality. The court held that proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 may ordinarily be heard in private to protect confidentiality and children’s identities. That principle was recognised as compatible with the European Convention by B v United Kingdom [2001] 2 FLR 261 and Pelling v Bruce-Williams [2004] 2 FLR 823.
2. A court order remains binding unless and until set aside or varied. Baker J had jurisdiction to prohibit communication of information concerning the proceedings. The order had not been appealed and had to be obeyed.
3. The court further held that it had power, in an exceptional case, to release information into the public domain. Here, the mother’s sustained publication of false and tendentious allegations created a need to correct the record. The court approved publication of anonymised versions of the earlier judgments and an information document, while preserving the child’s anonymity. The approach was consistent with the principle that the court’s judgment, based on all the evidence, is authoritative.
4. The court noted the danger of publishing one party’s account while ignoring the judge’s findings, referring to Re L (A Child: Media Reporting) [2011] EWHC B8 (Fam) and Re H (Freeing Orders: Publicity) [2005] EWCA Civ 1325, [2006] 1 FLR 815.
5. Section 91(14). The court had jurisdiction to restrict applications without leave. Applying the guidance in Re P (A Child) (Residence Order: A Child’s Welfare) [1999] 2 FLR 573, it held that this was wholly exceptional. A two-year order was justified and proportionate because the child and father required respite from litigation. The mother remained free to negotiate contact and to seek permission for a reasonable application.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.