Case details
Summary
In determining the meaning of allegedly defamatory words, the court must adopt the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader reading the publication once. Friendship and a business relationship do not, without more, imply actual guilt of impropriety or cronyism. They may nevertheless create reasonable grounds for suspicion, particularly where the friendship is close and longstanding and the circumstances suggest that the beneficiary knew proper procedures had not been followed. An imputation that a person knowingly accepted a benefit arising from unfair or improper conduct may be defamatory even if the conduct was not itself unlawful.
Factual background
This was a libel action concerning the meaning of passages in a newspaper article about contracts awarded by the Metropolitan Police Service to the claimant’s company. A related preliminary ruling by Eady J held that the words were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning: [2010] EWHC 700 (QB). The issue at trial was whether the words conveyed actual guilt, reasonable grounds to suspect guilt, or a less serious meaning, and whether that meaning was defamatory.
The dispute principally concerned a so-called vanity contract, while the article also referred to other contracts under investigation.
Held
The court adopted the natural and ordinary meaning test stated in Gillick v Brook Advisory Centres [2001] EWCA Civ 1263. The publication was to be read as a whole by an ordinary reasonable reader, without an over-elaborate or excessively literal analysis.
Friendship between persons involved in business, including dealings with a public authority, is not itself evidence of actual guilt of impropriety or cronyism. Nor did the adverse descriptions of the contract establish actual guilt.
Friendship in a business context may, however, create a reasonable suspicion that the interests of the friends conflict with their duties to their principals. The close, 30-year friendship and skiing relationship in this case provided reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant knew his company was benefiting from a contract not awarded in accordance with proper procedures.
The meaning therefore fell within Chase Level 2, namely reasonable grounds to suspect guilt, rather than Chase Level 1 actual guilt, applying the distinctions in Chase v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772. The words conveyed that the claimant was a willing beneficiary of improper conduct and cronyism in relation to the vanity contract and the other contracts worth millions of pounds of public money.
That imputation was defamatory. Defamatory conduct need not amount to a breach of a legal rule. Right-thinking members of society may think worse of a person who behaves unfairly or with trickery. Evans v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd [1993] ACTSC 7 did not assist the defendant because the meaning found here included reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant knew the benefit arose from friendship rather than proper tendering procedures.
The court accordingly found the pleaded words defamatory in the meaning stated above.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
This was a first-instance trial of meaning in the High Court. A related preliminary decision by Eady J held that the words were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning: [2010] EWHC 700 (QB).
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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