London Borough of Camden v The Parking Adjudicator & Ors

A parking adjudicator’s jurisdiction is confined to the grounds in the statutory appeals scheme. There is no general power to allow an appeal whenever an enforcement authority has acted unlawfully. An appeal must be allowed where the sum demanded exceeds the penalty prescribed by law, regardless of how an additional charge is characterised or whether payment by another method was available. “Procedural impropriety” has the specific statutory meaning given by the regulations. It may include contradictory, confusing or obscure wording that fails to comply with a statutory notice requirement. Public law issues may be considered only where the regulations permit them, including specified challenges to the underlying order and issues showing that the alleged contravention did not occur.

The Council sought judicial review of four decisions by Parking Adjudicators allowing appeals against penalty charge notices. The decisions arose after the Council had required motorists paying parking penalties by credit card to pay an additional 1.3 per cent administration charge. The Council accepted for the purposes of the proceedings that the charge was ultra vires, but did not concede that it affected the statutory penalty.

The central issues were whether the additional charge meant that the penalty exceeded the amount applicable, whether references to it constituted procedural impropriety, and whether a Parking Adjudicator had a broad power to entertain collateral public law challenges.

1. The applications were dismissed. The Parking Adjudicators were entitled to allow all four appeals. Where an enforcement authority demands a sum greater than the penalty fixed by the statutory scheme, the appeal must be allowed under regulation 4(4)(e) of the Appeals Regulations. The additional 1.3 per cent could not be separated from the penalty merely because credit-card payment was optional or the charge was described as an administration fee. The Council’s later abandonment of the charge did not cure the defect.
2. “Procedural impropriety” has the specific meaning assigned by regulation 4(5) of the Appeals Regulations. It means failure to observe a requirement imposed by the Traffic Management Act 2004, the General Regulations or the Appeals Regulations. Contradictory, confusing or obscure language may amount to such a failure. A notice to owner stating an additional charge overstated the amount of the penalty payable. A penalty charge notice that correctly stated the penalty and payment methods was not itself defective merely because the charge might later be demanded. The statutory scheme did not prescribe the content of a notice of rejection in the same way.
3. The statutory scheme defines the extent of the adjudicator’s jurisdiction. Regulation 7(4) permits a recommendation based on compelling reasons, but does not permit the adjudicator to direct cancellation on that basis. Regulation 4(4)(g) permits a qualified challenge to the validity of the underlying order. These provisions exclude a free-standing and unfettered power to allow appeals on the broad basis of collateral challenge.
4. The ground that the alleged contravention did not occur is not confined to the immediate physical facts. Subject to a caveat concerning events after the alleged contravention, it may include any matter that would provide a defence to the underlying criminal transgression, including failures concerning signs and lines and prior conduct making prosecution an abuse.
5. The earlier order granting the Parking Adjudicators costs protection was set aside. Such protection requires an application by the defendant and an explanation by reference to the governing principles. Wider costs protection for an inferior tribunal in judicial review proceedings is unusual and difficult to justify.

This was a first-instance judicial review application. Permission was granted by His Honour Judge Thornton QC sitting as a deputy High Court Judge on 5 March 2010. The substantive applications were dismissed by the Administrative Court.