Lane v Shah

Contempt consisting of knowingly false statements verified by Statements of Truth requires proof that the statements were false to the defendant’s knowledge and materially interfered with the course of justice. Deliberate lies used to exaggerate a personal injury claim constitute a public wrong because they corrupt the administration of justice. Where such conduct is serious, imprisonment may be required to mark its gravity and deter similar misconduct. Admissions and previous good character may mitigate sentence, but they do not necessarily justify suspension. Each defendant’s role and culpability remain relevant to the length of sentence.

The defendants admitted contempt arising from Statements of Truth supporting a personal injury claim. The first defendant falsely claimed that accident-related injuries prevented her from working and claimed substantial care and financial losses. Her husband and daughter supplied supporting false statements. Surveillance evidence led to admissions, and the underlying personal injury claim was compromised for a substantially reduced sum.

The Administrative Court was required to determine the appropriate sentences for the three contempts and the consequential costs order.

1. The court treated the proceedings as applications for committal for contempt based on false statements in documents verified by Statements of Truth. The relevant contempt is specifically provided for in Rules of the Supreme Court 52(1)(16) and CPR 32(14).
2. The claimant must prove that one or more statements of fact were false to the defendant’s knowledge and that the falsehood interfered with the course of justice in a material respect. The deliberate fabrication and verification of evidence concerning work, disability and care satisfied that test.
3. The court adopted the approach stated by Moses LJ in South Wales Fire and Rescue Service v Smith [2011] EWHC Admin 1749: persons making false claims should ordinarily expect imprisonment because the sentence must mark the gravity of the conduct, deter others and protect the administration of justice. The court wholly agreed with those observations.
4. Such contempt is a public wrong. Dishonestly perverting the process of litigation is more serious than an ordinary private lie because it corrupts the stream of public justice. The court noted that there is force in the view that a litigant who dishonestly perverts litigation should recover nothing, even where the underlying claim has some merit, but that issue did not require determination.
5. The court considered the comparable sentences in Nield v Loveday [2011] EWHC Admin 2324. The defendants’ admissions and previous good character were mitigating features, but the need to protect the administration of justice required immediate imprisonment. The first defendant was sentenced to six months and the second and third defendants to three months each. Each was to serve half the specified term under the applicable statutory provisions.
6. The defendants were ordered jointly and severally to pay the claimants’ costs of the application, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.