Henry v News Group Newspapers Ltd

An order for third-party disclosure under CPR 31.17 requires documents that may well support the applicant’s case or adversely affect another party’s case, and disclosure that is necessary for the fair disposal of the claim or to save costs. Once those conditions are met, the court must exercise its discretion by balancing the competing interests, including confidentiality, privacy, reputation and freedom of expression. Third-party rights may be relevant both to necessity and to fairness. There is no general rule governing disclosure of local-authority child-protection review material. The decision depends on the particular facts, the seriousness of the issues, the extent of existing disclosure and safeguards such as redaction or restrictions on public access.

News Group Newspapers Ltd applied for disclosure from the London Borough of Haringey in a libel action brought by Sylvia Henry. The claim concerned publications alleging that Ms Henry had been grossly incompetent in her professional handling of the child later known as Baby P.

The application remained in issue only for interviews conducted for individual management reviews and a second individual management review concerning decisions about the child. Haringey accepted relevance for CPR 31.17 but disputed necessity and relied on the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality and effectiveness of the review process. The central questions were whether the statutory conditions for third-party disclosure were met and how the competing public and Convention interests should be balanced.

1. Application granted. The court ordered Haringey to disclose the relevant parts of the individual management review interviews and the second individual management review.
2. Under CPR 31.17(3), the court may order disclosure only if the documents may well support the applicant’s case or adversely affect another party’s case, and disclosure is necessary to dispose fairly of the claim or to save costs. The word “likely” means “may well”, as explained in Three Rivers DC v Governor of Bank of England (No 4) [2003] 1 WLR 210.
3. The conditions in CPR 31.17(3)(a) and (b) were satisfied. Although substantial disclosure had already been made, the apparent contradiction between Ms Henry’s account and those of other members of her team meant that the relevant documents were necessary in the circumstances. The court accepted that necessity may fail in principle where an applicant already has sufficient material to advance its case.
4. The court’s discretion at the third stage required a balance of competing interests. Following the approach identified in Franson v Home Office [2003] 1 WLR 1952, public-interest considerations were considered after the two conditions were met. Privacy, confidentiality and reputation rights could be weighed alongside the public interest in resolving civil claims fairly and the defendant’s Article 10 rights. Third-party rights could support disclosure as well as oppose it.
5. The confidentiality and candour concerns surrounding individual management reviews were real, but the present case was unusual. The seriousness of the libel allegations and the possible consequences for the reputations of the professionals concerned gave disclosure particular importance. The material sought was limited to the child and the relevant period. Possible redaction or restrictions on public access could protect confidentiality, and the court would keep those matters under review under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 8.
6. There was no general answer to whether local-authority review documents should be disclosed. The issue depended on the particular facts. The court was satisfied that disclosure might assist NGN or adversely affect Ms Henry and was necessary for the fair disposal of the claim, including fairness to affected third parties.

First-instance decision. No earlier appellate decision is stated in the judgment.