CC v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis & Anor

Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 permits questioning and related powers without reasonable suspicion, but only for the statutory purpose of determining whether a person appears to have been concerned in terrorism. The powers cannot be used predominantly to obtain intelligence for another purpose, including supporting control-order proceedings or investigating alleged ill-treatment. The statutory purpose may include determining the nature or extent of the person’s apparent involvement, and an examination may continue while relevant information remains to be assessed. Detention powers must be strictly construed, and the detainee must be told that he is detained and why.

The claimant, who was subject to a control order under section 2(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, was questioned and detained at Heathrow under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. The police had received extensive intelligence about his alleged activities in Somalia and a request from the Security Service to obtain further intelligence, including information relevant to his detention and alleged ill-treatment in Somaliland.

The claim challenged the lawfulness of the examination, detention and handling of the claimant’s request for legal advice. The central issue was whether the Schedule 7 powers had been exercised for the statutory purpose of determining whether he appeared to be a terrorist, or predominantly for the purpose of obtaining information for the Security Service and the control-order proceedings.

1. Claim allowed in relation to the Schedule 7 examination. The powers in Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 are wide, but their predominant purpose must be determining whether the person appears to be a person within section 40(1)(b). They cannot lawfully be used for another purpose.

2. The absence of reasonable suspicion does not prevent an examination. The statutory purpose may include determining whether a person remains involved in terrorism, identifying the acts by which he appears to be a terrorist, or assessing the nature and extent of his apparent involvement. The examining officer may ask questions reasonably considered necessary to enable the relevant determination, including where an initial view may later prove wrong.

3. The examination in this case was unlawful. The claimant already appeared to the officers to be a terrorist on the information available, including the control order and intelligence supplied by the Security Service. Apart from briefly establishing his identity, there was little left to determine for the purposes of Schedule 7. The questions substantially followed a request designed to obtain intelligence about his time in Somalia, his travel to Somaliland and alleged ill-treatment. That purpose was unrelated to determining whether he appeared to be a terrorist.

4. The related search powers were subject to the same substantive statutory purpose. Schedule 7 powers were not conferred to enable an arrest, and an arrest might be inappropriate where the evidence could not properly be deployed in a prosecution.

5. The claimant’s further challenge concerning legal advice did not succeed. Although Schedule 8 expressly refers to detention at a police station, legal advice could properly be permitted wherever detention occurred. The notices were wrong to state that advice would not be at public expense, but it was unnecessary to decide anything further on that aspect.

6. The case was described as rare and the decision was not considered likely to impair the efficacy of Schedule 7 powers.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.