Neocleous v Jones

Interim relief under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 may restrain harassment carried out through Internet publications. Where Article 10 rights are engaged, the court must apply the threshold in section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and ask whether the claimant is likely to obtain similar permanent relief at trial.

The statutory defence for conduct that is reasonable may protect communications made to safeguard the parties’ or their clients’ legitimate interests. The defamation rule against injunctions where truth is intended to be proved does not govern harassment proceedings, which protect persons from harassment rather than reputation-based injury.

There were two related first-instance proceedings. Neoclis Neocleous sought protection from harassment by Stephen Jones. Edwin Coe LLP and David Greene, representing the firm’s members and employees, brought a separate representative claim seeking similar relief for themselves and their clients.

Jones sought an injunction against Edwin Coe LLP, a civil restraint order, and the striking out of Neocleous’s claim. The claimants sought interim injunctions restraining further harassment. The central issues were whether Jones had established any basis for relief, whether the alleged Internet communications amounted to harassment, and whether interim relief was justified consistently with Article 10 rights.

1. Jones’s application. The application against Edwin Coe LLP was procedurally defective because the firm was not a party to the proceedings. It also failed on the merits. The alleged email and allegations that the claimants had instructed others to harass Jones were unsupported by evidence of sufficient weight. The application was rejected and was totally without merit.
2. Harassment and interim relief. The Internet communications and threats relied upon by the claimants amounted to a course of conduct falling within the scope of harassment. Harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is not confined to stalking and may be committed through publication. The amended statutory protection for two or more persons was capable of applying to the representative claim.
3. Because the alleged harassment involved publication, Jones’s Article 10 rights were engaged. Applying the approach under section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the court had to be satisfied that the claimants were likely to obtain permanent relief of a similar nature at trial. The evidence, including the numerous communications and their apparent purpose, satisfied that threshold.
4. The statutory defences did not assist Jones. Communications made by the claimants to protect their own interests and those of their clients could in principle be reasonable. By contrast, the evidence established a proper basis for restraining Jones’s conduct. The rule in defamation proceedings that an injunction is refused where the defendant intends to prove the allegations true did not apply, since these claims concerned protection from harassment rather than protection of reputation. The draft order nevertheless preserved legitimate activities such as obtaining legal advice, defending the proceedings, and making genuine complaints to relevant authorities.
5. Relief was granted to the claimants for the legitimate protection of their interests and those of their clients, while further settlement discussions were encouraged.