Whiteside v The Director of Public Prosecutions

Service of a notice under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 may be effective when the notice is properly posted to the appropriate address, even if the addressee does not personally receive it. The offence under section 172(3) does not require proof that the defendant knew of the obligation to provide driver information. The statutory defences are sufficient to protect a person who could not reasonably comply. Under section 172(7)(b), lack of actual knowledge may support a defence, but it does not establish one automatically. The question is whether the defendant proves that it was not reasonably practicable to respond, including by showing that it was not reasonably practicable to become aware of the notice.

The claimant was convicted by Haywards Heath Magistrates’ Court of failing to provide driver information under section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Notices were posted to his registered address, but he did not personally see them because he was frequently abroad and relied on others to deal with his post.

By case stated, he challenged the conviction on three principal grounds: that knowledge of the requirement was part of the offence; that service required actual receipt; and that lack of actual receipt necessarily established the defence under section 172(7)(b). The central issue was whether the statutory scheme imposed liability despite the claimant’s lack of personal knowledge, subject to the defence of reasonable practicability.

1. Appeal dismissed. The notices were properly served when posted to the claimant’s address. Actual personal receipt was unnecessary. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1989 created a presumption of delivery in the ordinary course of post, which the claimant had not rebutted. Rule 4.4(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Rules supported service at an address where it was reasonably believed that the individual would receive the notice.
2. The offence under section 172(3) did not require mens rea consisting of knowledge that the defendant was under an obligation to provide the information. Sweet v Parsley (1970) AC 132 concerned the presumption against criminalising the blameless, but this regulatory offence was accompanied by statutory defences under sections 172(4) and 172(7)(b).
3. The principle in Harding v Price [1948] 1 KB 695, followed in Selby v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset [1988] RTR 216, did not govern this case. A registered keeper assumes responsibility for responding to correspondence sent to the registered address, and section 172(7)(b) provided an appropriate safeguard.
4. Section 172(7)(b) could apply where the defendant never saw a properly served notice. However, the defendant had to prove that it was not reasonably practicable to provide the information, including that it was not reasonably practicable to become aware of the notice. The magistrates were entitled to conclude that the claimant had not discharged that burden. The reference to due diligence was an unfortunate error, but it caused no material misdirection.

1. Haywards Heath Magistrates’ Court: convicted the claimant under section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal by case stated and answered the magistrates’ questions against the claimant.