Rencher-Paine v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

For a permanent agricultural dwelling in the open countryside, the relevant policy tests must be applied separately and purposively. The decision-maker must establish both the necessary agricultural functional requirement and the required financial basis for the enterprise. A labour calculation may assist in deciding whether an applicant is primarily employed in agriculture. Activities such as food processing and retailing may be excluded where they do not require a countryside location and fall outside agriculture for planning purposes. The financial assessment is objective and must consider whether the enterprise has a clear prospect of remaining financially sound in the short, medium and longer term. Personal ability to fund construction is not determinative. Reasons are adequate where, read as a whole, they address the principal controversial issues and enable an informed reader to understand the decision.

The applicant challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 an inspector’s dismissal of his appeal against refusal of planning permission for a permanent one-bedroom earthship dwelling and farm office at an ostrich farm in the open countryside.

The inspector accepted that there was a functional need for care and supervision of the birds, but concluded that the labour requirement was materially below that of a full-time worker and that the applicant was not primarily employed in agriculture. She also concluded that the enterprise could not presently support a permanent dwelling and lacked a clear prospect of remaining financially sound, particularly given the limited security of leased land. The applicant alleged irrationality and inadequate reasons. The central questions were whether the inspector had lawfully applied the functional and financial tests in Annex A to PPS7 and had adequately explained the planning conclusion.

1. The claim was dismissed. The inspector’s decision was neither irrational nor inadequately reasoned.

2. The functional test in paragraph 3(ii) of Annex A to PPS7 is disjunctive. The need must arise either from a full-time agricultural worker or from a person primarily employed in agriculture, rather than a part-time worker or hobby farmer. The guidance must be read in light of its purpose, namely protecting the countryside while permitting accommodation essential to support agriculture and other rural enterprises.

3. The inspector properly considered the labour requirement and the nature of the enterprise. The undisputed calculation produced a maximum requirement of about 0.3 of a full-time worker. Food processing and retailing did not require an open-countryside location and fell outside agriculture under section 336 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The labour calculation could also be used as a gauge of whether the applicant was primarily employed in agriculture.

4. The financial test in paragraph 3(iii) of Annex A required a clear prospect that the unit or agricultural activity would remain financially sound and sustain the proposed dwelling in the long term. The inspector was entitled to take an objective view beyond the applicant’s personal circumstances and to consider the security of the leased land, the available evidence and the short, medium and longer-term position. The earlier decision concerning a temporary dwelling addressed a different and less stringent task and did not require express reconciliation.

5. The inspector adopted the realistic approach required by paragraph 8 of Annex A. There was no adequate evidence that the enterprise operated on a subsistence basis with the wider benefits contemplated by that paragraph. The diversification argument did not alter the applicable tests.

6. Following South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No.2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953, the reasons were to be read straightforwardly and as a whole. The findings of conflict with the functional and financial tests adequately identified the harm to the countryside; the inspector did not need to repeat those findings in the final planning balance.

The judgment concerned a first-instance claim under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 challenging an inspector’s decision letter. No further appellate history is stated in the judgment.