Rupert Jolyon Richard St. John Webster v (1) Alison Virginia Ashcroft (2) John Francis Penley (3) Jennifer St. John Webster (4) Ian Rory St. John Webster and (5) Antonia Mary Sloane

An equity arising from proprietary estoppel is property capable of vesting in a trustee in bankruptcy. The equity may arise before the promisor’s death where the assurance, reliance and detriment have already established a right in equity to a transfer of the promised property. The court must distinguish the existence of the right from the circumstances in which it is enforced.

Summary judgment may be appropriate where a claim has no real prospect of success, but substantial factual difficulties do not justify disposing of a claim summarily where a valid explanation remains possible and the evidence has not been fully tested.

The claimant brought contentious probate proceedings concerning Valerie Webster’s wills and a separate claim based on constructive trust or proprietary estoppel. He alleged that his father, Valentine, and his mother had relied on testamentary assurances concerning The Priory and agricultural land.

The first and second defendants applied for summary judgment on the trust and proprietary estoppel claim. They argued that the claimant lacked standing, that any equity had vested in Valentine’s trustee in bankruptcy, and that the claim had no real prospect of success because later dealings with the property and delay were inconsistent with the alleged assurances.

1. Standing and secret trust. The court accepted that an alleged oral secret trust would be ineffective for want of writing under Law of Property Act 1925, section 53, and that only the trustee could enforce it, applying Roberts v Gill & Co. [2011] 1 A.C. 240. The claimant could nevertheless advance an alternative claim on behalf of his father’s estate after being appointed personal representative under section 50 of the Administration of Justice Act 1985.
2. Bankruptcy. The equity arising from the alleged assurances, reliance and detriment was property within section 436 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The equity was a right in equity to a transfer of the property, rather than merely a cause of action. It had therefore vested in the Official Receiver as Valentine’s trustee in bankruptcy before the promisor’s death. Jennings v Rice [2003] 1 P. & CR. 100 (C.A.) and Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch. 210 supported assessment of the minimum equity necessary to give effect to the promise and avoid unconscionability.
3. The claimant accordingly had no present standing to pursue Valentine’s claim. The claim would not be barred by this decision if the Official Receiver reassigned the equity.
4. Merits. The transfers and the delay raised powerful issues concerning inconsistency and laches, but the evidence left open a possible explanation and the claim was not fanciful or unreal. Summary judgment was therefore ordered solely because the claimant presently lacked standing.