Hinds, R (on the application of) v Blackpool Council

Under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, a planning authority must have regard to material considerations, but the duty does not require a formal committee reconsideration whenever a new matter arises after an in-principle resolution. Materiality is assessed objectively and broadly, including its practical effect on the land-use decision. A prospective change in planning policy may be capable of being material, although it need not be taken into account in every case. Where the authorised officer has considered the matter with the application in mind, and it could not realistically affect the outcome, the duty is satisfied without referral back to the committee.

Blackpool Council resolved to approve residential development at Marton Moss and later granted permission under delegated authority. Between those decisions, the Government announced its intention to abolish regional spatial strategies and purported to revoke them. The revocation was subsequently held void in Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWHC 2866 (Admin).

The applicant argued that the Government’s intention to abolish the strategies was a material consideration requiring reconsideration by the planning committee under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The court also considered whether the amended ground required permission and whether effective relief could be granted.

1. Disposition. Permission for the amended claim was declined on discretionary grounds, and the claim was dismissed. Even if permission had been granted, the claim would have failed on its merits.
2. Materiality. Section 70(2) requires regard to material considerations. The court adopted the definition in R (on the application of Kides) v South Cambridgeshire DC [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1370. Materiality must be assessed objectively in the light of all the facts and circumstances. Theoretical relevance may be too slight to qualify, and a consideration having no practical effect on the land-use decision need not be taken into account.
3. Duty to have regard. The duty is assessed overall. A formal referral to the planning committee is not invariably required merely because an officer knows of a new potentially material consideration. The guidance in Kides was satisfied where the authorised officer knew of the Government’s policy intention, considered the application with it in mind, and there was no realistic prospect of a different decision.
4. Prospective policy change. The intention to abolish regional spatial strategies could be capable of being material, and it might be wise to consider prospective changes affecting decisions with long-term consequences. But the judgment did not require that intention to be taken into account in every case. Here the decision was based on local housing and regeneration factors which were not dependent on regional strategy. The proposed change therefore had no material practical effect, or was de minimis.
5. Alternative conclusion. If the intention was material, the officer had nevertheless had sufficient regard to it. He considered the relevant government communications, the continuing regional strategy, local housing circumstances and the five-year housing-land-supply issue. The Council’s decision would have been unchanged.
6. Procedure and relief. The amended ground had not been clearly pleaded and should ordinarily have been raised earlier. Nevertheless, time alone caused no demonstrated real prejudice. Permission was refused because no effective relief could be granted, and the original and amended challenges were dismissed.

First-instance judicial review. No prior appellate history is stated in the judgment.