Kozluk, R (on the application of) v Circuit Court In Poland

Ordinary disruption to private and family life caused by extradition will not generally make surrender incompatible with Article 8. The court must conduct the required balancing exercise, but a person’s settled family life, spouse and children will not by themselves justify avoiding extradition.

An extradition court does not determine whether the requesting state’s allegations are truthful or well-founded. Matters concerning the evidence, delay and the fairness of the trial are ordinarily for the requesting state’s court. A physical injury will engage the statutory bar only where its severity makes extradition unjust or oppressive.

The claimant, a Polish national living in England with his wife and children, appealed against an order of District Judge Tubbs at Westminster Magistrates’ Court requiring his extradition to Poland to stand trial for driving while disqualified.

He relied on family life under Article 8, delay under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, and his injured and partly amputated index finger under section 25. He also disputed the truth of the Polish allegations and the evidence of the prosecuting police officer.

1. Appeal dismissed. None of the grounds advanced established a basis for overturning the extradition order.
2. The claimant had private and family life in England. The court nevertheless had to balance that interest against the requirement that persons accused of offences stand trial in the jurisdiction where the alleged offences occurred. The ordinary disruption caused to a spouse and children by extradition did not take this case outside the general run of cases and did not establish an Article 8 infringement.
3. The extradition court could not determine whether the Polish charges were well-founded or whether the police officer’s evidence was honest and accurate. Those matters were for the Polish court. Poland was a Council of Europe member and the claimant would have the benefit of Article 6 of the Convention.
4. There had been an unwelcome delay between the alleged offence and the extradition proceedings. That did not make it impossible for the claimant to receive a fair trial in Poland. His arguments concerning delay could be advanced before the Polish court, which would determine their significance and weight. The section 14 bar was therefore not established.
5. The claimant’s finger injury and rehabilitation, although unfortunate, were not sufficiently severe to engage section 25(2). The circumstances disclosed no statutory exception making extradition unjust or oppressive.
6. The court did not decide the separate issue of receiving fresh evidence under the test in Fenyvesi, because none of the claimant’s arguments constituted a proper ground for resisting extradition.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: On 14 October 2010 District Judge Tubbs made an uncontested order for the claimant’s extradition to Poland to stand trial.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against that order was dismissed.