O (A Child), R (on the application of) v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham

A local authority deciding how to accommodate a disabled child under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 must identify an arrangement meeting the child’s needs for stability, structure and minimal transitions. The court applies an intensity of review proportionate to the objective impact of the decision, while avoiding substitution of its own view for that of the authority. Parental preference is a relevant factor where the preferred placement is independent, but it is not binding. A previous educational tribunal decision must be given appropriate, not determinative, weight where circumstances and needs have changed. A mandatory order is exceptional. It is available only where, properly directing itself in law and on the facts, the public authority has only one legally permissible outcome.

O was an autistic child with complex needs. His parents sought immediate accommodation at Purbeck View School, followed by a 52-week residential placement. The local authority accepted that its duty under section 20(1)(c) of the Children Act 1989 had arisen, but proposed continued attendance at LVS Hassocks until September 2011, followed by residential accommodation at Sybil Elgar School and education at Queensmill School.

The claim challenged the proposed arrangements on grounds including parental preference, statutory guidance, the section 20 duty, cost, Article 8 and irrationality. The central issue was whether the local authority’s decision was unlawful and whether the court should require placement at Purbeck View.

1. Permission and principal relief. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted. The decision of 8 March 2011 was set aside on Wednesbury grounds. The application for an immediate mandatory order requiring placement at Purbeck View was refused.
2. Statutory duty. The duty under section 20(1)(c) of the Children Act 1989 was accepted to arise. Whether carers were prevented from providing suitable accommodation or care was an objective question for the local authority, not one conclusively determined by the parents. The authority had to make arrangements appropriate to the child’s particular needs under section 23.
3. Relevant considerations. Parental preference for Purbeck View was a material factor, although the preference was not binding because the school was independent. The authority had followed the relevant Children Act guidance. Cost was not a determining factor. Article 8 added nothing material to the statutory analysis because the statutory scheme was directed towards positive obligations consistent with Article 8.
4. Intensity of review. The profound impact of the decision justified careful and context-sensitive scrutiny, but the court could not substitute its own assessment for that of the local authority. The authority was entitled to rely on its own experienced social workers and to give little or no weight to opposing expert evidence if its own view was sound.
5. Irrationality. The authority gave excessive weight to the First-tier Tribunal’s earlier educational decision, which addressed educational need at an earlier stage and had been overtaken by the later Core Assessment. It also gave insufficient weight to the accepted need for minimal transitions. Daily travel between Sybil Elgar and Queensmill, potentially involving different cars and drivers, conflicted on its face with the requirements of stability and structure. The decision therefore required reconsideration.
6. Mandatory relief. Following R v Ealing London Borough Council, ex parte Parkinson (1995) 29 HLR 179, mandatory relief is rare and is appropriate only where the authority, properly directing itself, has only one legally available outcome. That threshold was not met because immediate placement at Purbeck View was not the only lawful option.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judgment records an earlier directions hearing before Ouseley J, but this was part of the same proceedings and was not an appellate decision.