Police of the Metropolis & Anoir v Times Newspapers Ltd & Anor

On an interim application concerning confidential police material in a libel action, complex questions about fair-trial rights, freedom of expression, confidentiality and the defences of truth and responsible publication should not be determined summarily where the available material and argument are insufficient. Such issues may properly be left for trial. Serious allegations pleaded in a defence of truth remain subject to the presumption that they are false until proved.

The claimants brought injunction proceedings against Times Newspapers Ltd and Michael Gillard concerning confidential police-source material which the defendants wished to use in defending a libel claim brought by David Hunt. The material had been restrained by an interim order. The defendants sought permission to use it, while related applications concerned directions and a possible stay of the libel action.

The court considered submissions based on Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention and the common law. The central issue was whether the injunction proceedings could fairly be determined on an interim application.

1. The application to vary the injunction was dismissed. The court could not fairly resolve the proceedings on an interim application. The issues concerned the defendants’ ability to rely on confidential material, their Article 6 and Article 10 rights, the claimant’s Article 6 and Article 8 rights, and third-party confidentiality interests. The matter had to proceed to trial.
2. A defendant in a libel action ordinarily has a right to plead truth and, having done so, to seek disclosure from the claimant and non-parties so that the truth or falsity of the allegations can be investigated. The court’s provisional view was that the authorities relied on did not determine the particular situation where the defendant also had a Reynolds defence.
3. The court had not heard full argument on the conflict between the parties’ Article 6 rights or on the consequences of excluding material protected by third-party confidentiality or privilege. It therefore made no final determination on whether the defendants’ ability to defend the libel claim was materially restricted, whether confidentiality should be overridden, or whether a stay was necessary.
4. Nothing in the judgment displaced the presumption that the allegations against Hunt were false unless and until proved true. The related applications in the libel action were adjourned for hearing by another judge, and directions were invited for the libel action to proceed to trial.