Eagle v Redlime Ltd

For limitation purposes under Limitation Act 1980, a claimant need not know the precise extent or true cause of damage, or possess sufficient detail to plead a fully particularised claim. Time begins when the claimant has knowledge of damage sufficiently serious to justify proceedings and knows enough to make it reasonable to investigate whether the damage is capable of being attributed to the defendant’s act or omission. A real possibility of attribution is sufficient; certainty and knowledge of legal negligence are unnecessary. Where that knowledge existed before proceedings were issued, the three-year period under section 14A may bar the claim.

The claimant alleged that construction work carried out by the defendant in 2000 had resulted in defective foundations, subsidence and cracking at a kennel property. He claimed damages in tort. The defendant denied liability and contended that the claim was barred by limitation.

By order of HHJ Seymour QC, the limitation issue was tried as a preliminary issue. The claimant contended that he acquired the relevant knowledge only when he received an engineer’s report dated 15 November 2006. The central question was when he first had the knowledge required by section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980.

1. Claim statute barred. The claim in tort was dismissed as statute barred. The parties were directed to agree an order, including costs.
2. Under section 14A, the relevant starting date is the earliest date on which the claimant had both knowledge of the material facts about sufficiently serious damage and knowledge that the damage was attributable, in whole or in part, to the act or omission alleged to constitute negligence.
3. Knowledge does not require certainty, knowledge of the precise cause, or knowledge of the full extent of the damage. The claimant must know enough to make it reasonable to begin investigating the possibility of a claim. The word attributable means capable of being attributed, and requires a real possibility rather than a fanciful possibility that the damage resulted from the defendant’s act or omission.
4. By 29 October 2006 the claimant knew of subsidence, separation of the drainage channels from the slab, and cracking to the walls and windows. Those facts were sufficiently serious under section 14A(7). He also knew that the defendant had carried out the relevant ground works, had not followed the surveyor’s drawings, and had used the method described as the modern method. His belief that the precise defect lay in the installation of the drainage channels, rather than in the design of the slab, did not prevent time running.
5. The claimant’s communications with solicitors, his request that the defendant investigate, and his letter of 9 October 2006 showed that he knew enough to investigate further and believed that the damage was capable of being attributed to something done by the defendant. The later expert report identified the true cause and greater extent of the damage, but did not establish the starting date.
6. The alternative issue of constructive knowledge under section 14A(10) did not arise. If it had arisen, the claimant had acted reasonably by seeking assistance and obtaining an expert report shortly after receiving the defendant’s response.