Montgomery v Brown

Contempt of court requires proof, to the criminal standard, that a statement was false, that the maker knew it was false, and that, when made, it was likely to interfere materially with the administration of justice. The maker must also know of that likelihood. The fact that solicitors or insurers could later discover the truth does not provide a defence, although it may be relevant to the maker’s state of mind. Genuine doubt must be resolved in the respondent’s favour. A court may reconsider a draft judgment before it is handed down, but that power should be exercised sparingly and only in an exceptional case.

The claimant suffered serious injuries in a road accident caused by the defendant’s admitted negligence. His personal injury claim was issued in 2007 and compromised in November 2008, with judgment entered for £63,750 subject to deductions and the claimant agreeing to pay the defendant’s costs.

The defendant later obtained permission to bring contempt proceedings. He alleged that the claimant had dishonestly concealed remunerated offshore work, made false statements, and advanced an inflated claim. The claimant accepted that some statements were misleading or incorrect and that he had handled parts of the litigation carelessly, but denied dishonest intent.

The court initially circulated a draft judgment dismissing the application. Further documents were then disclosed, and both parties invited the court to reconsider its findings. The central issues were whether the court had power to reconsider the draft judgment and whether the claimant’s conduct satisfied the legal test for contempt.

1. Reconsideration of draft judgment. Having considered Charlesworth v Relay Roads [2000] 1 WLR 230, Stewart v Engel [2000] 1 WLR 2268, Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond [2001] EWCA Civ 778 and Robinson v Bird [2003] EWCA Civ 1820, the court held that it had power to reconsider its draft judgment in light of further evidence. That power should be exercised sparingly and only in an exceptional case. Both parties wished the court to retain the matter, so the court heard further evidence and submissions.
2. Applicable contempt test. Contempt proceedings are criminal in nature and must be proved to the criminal standard. Any genuine doubt must be resolved in the respondent’s favour. Under CPR 32.14, the rule creates no new category of contempt. The relevant question is whether the respondent made or caused a false statement to be made without an honest belief in its truth.
3. Following the reasoning in Malgar Limited v. R E Leach (Engineering) Limited [2000] FSR 393 and, in particular, the formulation adopted in Sony Computer Entertainment and Others v. Ball and Others [2004] EWHC 1984 CH, the court had to be satisfied that the statements were false; that the respondent knew they were false when made; that, if persisted in, they were likely to interfere with the course of justice in a material respect; and that he knew of that likelihood.
4. The later availability of inquiries or documents capable of revealing the truth did not itself furnish a defence. It was, however, relevant evidence when assessing whether the respondent intended to conceal his work and earnings. The respondent had previously disclosed his offshore work and authorised inquiries of his employer. The evidence also showed substantial failures by his solicitors to obtain current information and to explain or approve documents containing statements of truth.
5. The claimant’s conduct was careless and unsatisfactory in several respects, including signing documents without properly reading them. Nevertheless, the evidence did not establish deliberate dishonesty to the criminal standard. The claimant was therefore not in contempt of court and the application was dismissed.

The judgment describes an earlier draft judgment dismissing the contempt application. Following further disclosure, the court reconsidered that draft judgment with the consent of both parties and gave this final determination.