Lightfoot v Go-Ahead Group Plc

In assessing contributory negligence by an intoxicated pedestrian, the court must examine the claimant’s conduct rather than treating intoxication itself as negligence. Apportionment depends on both comparative blameworthiness and each party’s responsibility for the damage. A driver remains subject to a high standard of care because a motor vehicle is potentially dangerous, and a pedestrian will rarely bear the greater share unless he or she suddenly moves into the vehicle’s path. The court must assess the particular facts, including the driver’s opportunity to observe and avoid the pedestrian and the causative potency of each party’s conduct.

The claimant suffered serious injuries when struck by a bus driven by the defendant’s employee on a dark rural road. Primary liability was admitted during the trial, but the defendant alleged that the claimant’s own negligence substantially contributed to the accident. The claimant had consumed alcohol, entered the carriageway between bus stops and attempted to flag down the bus. The central issue was the proper apportionment of responsibility between the negligent driver and the claimant.

1. Primary liability. The defendant’s driver was negligent. He diverted his attention to a timetable, held it in one hand, lowered his head and switched on the interior cabin light, thereby impairing forward visibility. He failed to keep a proper lookout for approximately two to four seconds. The court also found that, on this dark and unlit rural road with no oncoming traffic, it was negligent not to use main-beam headlights.
2. Effect of intoxication. Applying Lunt v Khelifa [2002] EWCA Civ 801 and the reasoning in Liddell v Middleton (1996) PIQR 36, the relevant question was what the claimant did, not the fact that he was drunk or the explanation for his conduct. The claimant’s act of walking onto the carriageway and attempting to flag down the bus was careless.
3. Apportionment. The claimant’s conduct was significantly hazardous, but a fully observant driver would still have had sufficient time to see and avoid him. The court applied the principle identified in Eagle v Chambers [2003] EWCA Civ 1107 that a pedestrian will rarely be more responsible than the driver, particularly where the driver had an adequate opportunity to avoid the collision. The court distinguished the materially different circumstances in Ehrari v Curry [2007] EWCA Civ 120.
4. Responsibility was apportioned 60% to the defendant and 40% to the claimant. Damages were accordingly reduced by 40% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.