Suggitt v Suggitt & Anor

A proprietary estoppel claim requires proof of an assurance of a proprietary interest, reasonable reliance and detriment resulting from that reliance. The assurance must be sufficiently clear in its context, although it may be oblique or allusive. The court assesses the matter at the point when the equity crystallises and asks whether it would be unconscionable for the assurance not to be honoured. If an equity arises, the court has a broad discretion to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result, taking account of proportionality and the claimant’s reasonable expectations.

John Michael Suggitt claimed that his deceased father, Frank, had repeatedly assured him that he would inherit the family farmland and associated property. The claim was brought against Caroline Ann Suggitt and David Alan Robinson, the executors of Frank’s will, which left the estate to Caroline but expressed a wish that she should transfer the farmland to John if he proved capable of managing it.

The court heard the proprietary estoppel claim first. The related claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 was deferred. The central issues were whether Frank had given an enforceable assurance, whether John had relied on it to his detriment, and how any resulting equity should be satisfied.

1. Proprietary estoppel. Applying the principles reviewed in Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776, the claimant had to establish an assurance that he would acquire a proprietary interest in identified property, reliance on that assurance, and detriment resulting from reasonable reliance. The actual intention of the promisor was not decisive. The question was how the words and conduct would reasonably have been understood in their social and family context.
2. The identity of the property had to be certain, but its precise extent could be determined when the equity crystallised. The assurances did not need to be the claimant’s sole inducement. Ultimately, the court had to consider whether, looking at the circumstances as they had developed, it would be unconscionable for the assurance to be broken.
3. John had established the elements of the equity. Frank’s repeated assurances reasonably led John to expect that the farmland, and by implication somewhere to live, would be his after Frank’s death. John had relied on those assurances and had suffered detriment, although the work and sacrifice were modest and substantially less than in Thorner v Major.
4. The equity did not entitle John to everything claimed. Applying the broad remedial discretion described in Jennings v Rice [2003] 1 P & CR 100 CA, the court sought a proportionate solution which met his reasonable expectations while recognising Caroline’s position.
5. John was to receive the farmland, subject to the existing farm-sharing arrangements with the Conings, a house—preferably Wellfield—and incidental farm outbuildings and machinery. He was not entitled to the business bank accounts or other assets. Caroline retained the remainder of the estate and the relevant interim farm income. Further argument on the precise form and consequences of the order was reserved.