The Attorney General v Keron Matthews (Trinidad and Tobago)

A procedural time limit does not itself create an implied sanction when the applicable rules do not expressly specify and impose that consequence. A defence may therefore be filed after the prescribed period but before default judgment, subject to the court’s power to extend time and the claimant’s right to request default judgment.

An application to set aside default judgment is governed by the conditions specifically prescribed for that remedy. The additional conditions governing relief from sanctions do not apply. The overriding objective informs interpretation but cannot displace the only interpretation permitted by the rules’ language.

The respondent claimed damages against the State for assault and battery by a prison officer. The State failed to file its defence within the prescribed 42 days. Before default judgment was entered, it applied for an extension of time under rules 10.3(5) and 26.1(1)(d) of the Civil Proceedings Rules.

Gobin J refused the respondent permission to enter default judgment and extended time for the defence. By a majority, the Court of Appeal reversed both orders. It treated the expiry of the time limit as imposing an implied sanction, so that the State had to satisfy rule 26.7.

The central issue before the Board was whether late filing attracted an implied sanction requiring relief under rule 26.7, or merely engaged the ordinary power to extend time.

1. Appeal allowed. Lord Dyson delivered the judgment of the Board. The expiry of the prescribed period for filing a defence did not impose an implied sanction requiring relief under rule 26.7. The Court of Appeal had therefore applied the wrong procedural regime.

2. A defence can be filed after expiry without the court’s prior permission. If the claimant takes no action or waives lateness, the defence stands. Rule 10.3(5) draws no distinction between applications to extend time made before and after expiry. Before default judgment, the defendant may apply for an extension while the claimant may request judgment under rule 12.4.

3. Rules 26.6 and 26.7 must be read together. Relief is required where a rule itself expressly specifies and imposes a consequence for non-compliance. Rules 29.13(1), 28.13(1) and 33.12(1) illustrate such express sanctions. No corresponding provision states that a late defence may be filed only with permission. Exposure to a possible request for default judgment is not itself a sanction imposed by the rules.

4. The implied-sanction doctrine was also inconsistent with the distinct scheme for setting aside default judgments. Rule 13.3 prescribes two conditions: a realistic prospect of success and action as soon as reasonably practicable after learning of the judgment. A defendant satisfying those conditions need not additionally satisfy rule 26.7(3). Had those cumulative requirements been intended, rule 13.3 would have said so expressly.

5. The Board respected the Court of Appeal’s aim of promoting prompt and responsible litigation. The overriding objective must inform interpretation, but an unambiguous rule must be given effect according to its language. Any extension of rule 26.7(3) to default judgments requires express amendment by the Rules Committee.

6. The parties were permitted 28 days to make submissions on costs.

1. Privy Council: The appeal was allowed. The Court of Appeal’s orders were displaced because no implied sanction arose from the late defence.

2. Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago: By a majority, the court allowed the claimant’s appeal, reversed both orders of Gobin J and permitted entry of judgment in default of defence. Narine JA dissented.

3. High Court: Gobin J dismissed the application for permission to enter default judgment and extended time for filing and serving the defence.