The Entry Clearance Officer, Lagos v Taiwo Apome Wusa

Where paragraph 159A(ii) of the Immigration Rules requires evidence of a connection between a domestic worker and the employer, the connection must extend beyond the contractual relationship of employment. The requirement applies where the worker relies on employment in a household used regularly by the employer rather than prior co-residence under the same roof.

A house is not necessarily the employer’s household. Regular use requires visits that are reasonably frequent and amount to habitual use; isolated and infrequent visits do not suffice.

The Entry Clearance Officer appealed against Immigration Judge Kempton’s decision allowing Ms Wusa’s appeal from the refusal of entry clearance as a domestic worker in a private household.

The claimant had worked in a Nigerian house owned by her employer and his wife, but they had lived in the United Kingdom since 2005 and had made only brief visits to that house. The issue was whether she met paragraph 159A(ii) of the Immigration Rules: employment in a household used regularly by the employer, with evidence of a connection between employer and employee.

1. Appeal allowed. The Immigration Judge’s determination was set aside and remade. The claimant’s underlying appeal was dismissed because she did not satisfy paragraph 159A(ii) of the Immigration Rules.

2. The Nigerian property could be a house owned by the employer and his wife without being their household. Applying JF (Domestic Servant) Philippines [2008] UKAIT 00085, the Tribunal held that use on a regular basis requires reasonably frequent visits and habitual use. The employers had slept there for only about one month in total after effectively settling in the United Kingdom. Their visits were neither frequent nor habitual.

3. The Tribunal also held that the required connection between employer and employee is additional to employment itself. Employment is required throughout paragraph 159A, but a further tie is required where entry clearance is sought on the basis of employment in a regularly used household rather than a year of co-residence. No such non-employment connection existed on the facts.

4. Each failure was sufficient to show that the refusal was in accordance with the Rules.

• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): Allowed the Entry Clearance Officer’s appeal, set aside Immigration Judge Kempton’s decision, and remade the decision by dismissing the claimant’s appeal.

• First-tier Tribunal: Immigration Judge Kempton had allowed the claimant’s appeal against the refusal of entry clearance.