Ali v London Borough of Wandsworth

[2012] EWCA Civ 1337

Case details

Case citations
[2012] EWCA Civ 1337
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
18 October 2012
Judgment text

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Subjects
Housing Administrative law Intentional homelessness
Keywords
intentional homelessness Housing Act 1996 section 191 good faith relevant fact causation housing benefit second appeal permission CPR Part 52.13
Outcome
permission refused
Judicial consideration

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Summary

For intentional homelessness under the Housing Act 1996, an honest mistake about a fact is relevant only if it caused the person to surrender accommodation. Where the person would have ended the tenancy for another reason, the mistake has no causative significance and does not prevent the act being deliberate under section 191. A reviewing authority may therefore find intentional homelessness on that basis. Permission for a second appeal requires an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason. A proposed appeal with no real prospect of success and neither feature should not proceed.

Factual background

Khadija Ali appealed to Wandsworth County Court against the London Borough of Wandsworth’s decision that she was intentionally homeless under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996. The authority had found that she deliberately ended her tenancy to recover the deposit and fund travel to Uganda. Its review under section 202 affirmed that decision, and the county court dismissed her section 204 appeal. She renewed an application for permission for a second appeal, arguing that her honest mistake about continued housing-benefit payments had not been properly considered. The central issues were whether that mistake was relevant to the causation of her homelessness and whether the second-appeal criteria were met.

Held

  1. Permission refused. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success. The application also failed to identify an important point of principle or practice, or any other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear a second appeal.
  2. Under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996, intentional homelessness depends on a deliberate act or omission which causes the person to cease occupying accommodation that was available and reasonable to continue occupying. Mrs Ali had deliberately terminated her tenancy so that she could recover the £600 deposit and use it to pay for travel. That was the operative cause of her loss of accommodation.
  3. Section 191(2) protects an act or omission done in good faith while the person is unaware of a relevant fact. The court held that the unknown fact must have causal significance. Mrs Ali’s misunderstanding about the continuation of housing-benefit payments during her absence made no difference to her decision. Her case was that she needed the deposit to fund the journey and could obtain it only by ending the tenancy. She did not contend that, if correctly informed, she would have kept the tenancy and found another source of funds. The mistake was therefore irrelevant for section 191(2).
  4. The authority was entitled to conclude that Mrs Ali had made herself intentionally homeless, and the county court was entitled to uphold that conclusion. A contrary decision would probably have been perverse. Lord Justice Rimer agreed with the earlier refusal of permission by Lloyd LJ.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Rimer refused the renewed application for permission for a second appeal.
  2. Wandsworth County Court: His Honour Judge Welchman dismissed the appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 on 23 April 2012.
  3. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lloyd LJ refused permission on the papers on 17 July 2012.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
permission refused

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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