B (A Child)

Appellate courts must show restraint when overturning a trial judge's welfare and threshold findings, asking whether the judge has gone beyond the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible. Rather than requiring present injury, the Children Act 1989 threshold can be satisfied by a real risk of significant future harm where long‑standing personality, somatisation or deception problems and a lack of meaningful engagement with professionals make effective monitoring and risk‑management impracticable.

The child had been in local authority foster care since shortly after birth. HHJ Cryan had found that the parents exhibited long‑standing dishonesty, personality disorder traits, a diagnosis of somatisation/possible factitious disorder in the mother, and the father's history of offending and poor engagement with professionals. The local authority sought a care order with a plan for adoption; the parents appealed. The Court of Appeal reviewed the judge's threshold and welfare reasoning, the expert evidence, and whether less intrusive measures or assessment of the father alone were practicable. The central issue was whether the judge was plainly wrong to find the threshold satisfied and to order permanent removal given the feasibility (or not) of a risk‑management plan.

Overall disposition: Appeal dismissed; the trial judge's threshold and welfare findings and his decision to make a care order with a plan for adoption were within the generous ambit for reasonable disagreement.

1. Appellate standard and deference: The court emphasised the established principle that appellate interference with a trial judge's findings of fact and evaluative welfare judgments should be cautious. The relevant test is whether the judge exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible. The judge's advantage in observing witnesses and his detailed previous involvement in related proceedings reinforced deference to his assessment. (Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1; Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 2 FLR 763; G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] FLR 894.)
2. Threshold (s.31 Children Act 1989): The judge was entitled to find that the threshold of "likely to suffer significant harm" was crossed on the basis of real future risks, not merely past events. Those risks included the mother's diagnosed somatisation and possible factitious disorder, pervasive and long‑standing deceptive behaviour, and the father's impulsivity, criminal history and poor engagement with professionals. These features, together with the prospect that the parents would not engage honestly with a safeguarding plan, justified the conclusion that A was likely to suffer significant harm if returned. The court accepted that the threshold need not be the most extreme but must be more than commonplace parental inadequacy. (See discussion of threshold authorities.)
3. Welfare and proportionality: In deciding the welfare remedy, the judge examined alternatives and concluded that less intrusive measures were not a practicable or proportionate response. He accepted expert evidence that effective protection would require sustained therapeutic and professional engagement, and he found the parents unlikely to engage constructively and honestly. On that basis, permanent removal (care order with plan for adoption) was a proportionate and open option. The court endorsed the need to weigh proportionality and to avoid waiting for harm where long‑standing problems make harm likely. (Re C and B (Care Order: Future Harm) [2001] 1 FLR 61.)
4. Evaluation of expert evidence and challenged findings: The Court of Appeal reviewed criticisms of the trial judge's handling of expert evidence (notably Dr Bass) and his assessment of professional reports. It concluded that his case‑management and evaluative choices (including permitting re‑examination material and discounting certain experts' views) lay within the ambit of permissible judicial judgment and did not warrant intervention.
5. Assessment of the father as sole carer: The judge was entitled to decline an assessment of the father as sole carer when the evidence showed a realistic prospect that the parents would remain a unit, that the father could not be relied on to act as an independent protective influence, and that the necessary monitoring would be ineffective.
6. Conclusion and orders: Given the complexity, the history and the judge's careful reasoning, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The trial judge's threshold and welfare conclusions, and the care order with plan for adoption, were not shown to be plainly wrong.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the Principal Registry of the Family Division (HHJ Cryan). This court heard the appeal and dismissed it, upholding the lower court's care order and plan for adoption.
• Principal Registry of the Family Division: HHJ Cryan – care order made (detailed factual and expert findings and welfare analysis) (decision under appeal).