Mannion v Ginty

A first-instance decision on relief from sanctions is discretionary. An appellate court may intervene only where the judge took account of irrelevant matters, ignored relevant matters, or reached a plainly wrong decision.

Under CPR 3.9, the court must consider all relevant circumstances. It need not recite every listed factor separately where its reasoning shows that it addressed the material considerations. Repeated non-compliance, an unexplained delay in seeking relief, and the interests of the administration of justice may outweigh the serious consequences for the defaulting party, even where the default was attributable to that party’s representative.

Summary disposal and strike-out for non-compliance may be compatible with Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 8 requires the court to consider the effect on a person’s home, but does not remove its case-management powers.

The dispute concerned the beneficial ownership of a leasehold flat. Mr Mannion had provided the purchase money when Miss Ginty exercised a right to buy. He alleged that she had agreed to transfer the flat to him after living there rent-free for three years. She alleged that the money was a gift.

Miss Ginty’s defence was struck out after non-compliance with disclosure and an unless order. Later attempts to obtain relief from sanctions, and to pursue permission to appeal, were marked by further non-compliance and delay. Roth J struck out her application for permission to appeal.

David Richards J dismissed her later application for relief from that sanction. With permission of Arden LJ, Miss Ginty appealed, contending that the refusal was disproportionate because it prevented a trial of her defence and risked loss of her home under Articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lewison LJ, with whom Mummery and Jackson LJJ agreed, held that there was no basis for appellate interference with David Richards J’s discretionary refusal of relief from sanctions.
2. The applicable appellate standard was narrow. Relief from sanctions is entrusted to the first-instance judge. The Court of Appeal may interfere only if the judge considered irrelevant matters, failed to consider relevant matters, or was plainly wrong. The judge had considered the relevant circumstances under CPR 3.9.
3. The judge was not required to rehearse each CPR 3.9 factor in a formulaic sequence. His reasons addressed the history of non-compliance, the interests of the administration of justice, the absence of an adequate explanation for delay, the responsibility of Miss Ginty’s representative, and the effects on both parties. The delay between the striking out on 17 May and the application on 10 August remained inadequately explained.
4. Article 6 did not prevent summary disposal or striking out for failure to obey court orders. Nor did the fact that the dispute concerned Miss Ginty’s home remove the court’s case-management powers. Article 8 required the court to take account of the effect on her home, and the judge had done so when assessing the serious consequences of refusing relief.
5. The judge had, if anything, approached the application favourably by concentrating on the final period of delay rather than the full history of defaults. Robust but fair case management required enforcement of orders. The refusal of relief was therefore neither disproportionate nor erroneous.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed Miss Ginty’s appeal from David Richards J’s refusal of relief from sanctions.
• Chancery Division: David Richards J dismissed, on 4 October 2011, the application for relief from the sanction imposed when the application for permission to appeal was struck out.
• Earlier appeal proceedings: Roth J made an unless order concerning the appeal bundle and, after non-compliance, struck out the application for permission to appeal on 17 May 2011.
• County Court proceedings: Miss Ginty’s defence was struck out following non-compliance with disclosure orders. HHJ Marshall QC subsequently dismissed a further application for relief and authorised execution of a transfer of the flat to Mr Mannion.