C (Children), Re

An order under section 34(4) of the Children Act 1989 empowers a local authority to suspend contact when necessary; it does not terminate contact. The power operates alongside the duty to allow reasonable contact and the court’s power to vary or discharge the order. Procedural fairness is satisfied where the parent knows the application and its basis, and has a meaningful opportunity to respond or seek an adjournment. A judge conducting care proceedings over time may rely on earlier judgments even if a later judgment does not expressly incorporate them. On the facts, the unresolved harmful features of contact justified the order.

The father appealed from Barnet County Court, where Her Honour Judge Mayer had made care orders and granted the local authority permission under section 34(4) of the Children Act 1989 to suspend contact. He argued that the application had not been properly notified or supported by evidence, that he had not had a fair opportunity to respond, and that the order unlawfully and disproportionately interfered with family life. The appeal also challenged the order’s merits, including the alleged absence of exceptional circumstances and a finite period. The central issues were whether the procedure was fair and whether the evidence justified the statutory power.

Lady Justice Black gave the principal judgment. The President of the Queen’s Bench Division and Lord Justice Moses agreed. The appeal was dismissed on both procedural and substantive grounds.

1. Procedural fairness. The father knew before the hearing that the local authority would seek a section 34(4) order and knew the basis of the application. The matters were substantially within his own knowledge. He could respond in his position statement, address alleged factual or welfare errors, or seek an adjournment. The judge explained the concerns, invited him to answer them, allowed him time to consider the contact agreement, and negotiated one modification. He neither sought an adjournment nor used the opportunity provided to challenge the wider case. The absence of a separately issued application, supporting witnesses or oral evidence therefore did not make the process unfair. Re C (Litigant in Person: s 91(14) Order) [2009] EWCA Civ 674 concerned a different type of order and did not require a different conclusion.
2. Use of earlier judgments. The judge’s fact-finding, May and July judgments had to be read together. Judicial continuity permits a judge with detailed knowledge of the family to rely on earlier findings when deciding contact. Express incorporation of earlier judgments is helpful, but its absence does not prevent those judgments forming part of the material considered.
3. Nature of the statutory power. Section 34(4) of the Children Act 1989 authorises suspension of contact when necessary. It is not an order that there must be no contact. The local authority remains subject to the statutory framework, including the duty under section 34(1) to allow reasonable contact. Section 34(9) provides a route for the order to be varied or discharged if circumstances change.
4. Merits. The order was justified by the cumulative history of contact, the continuing inappropriate and undermining behaviour, the effect on the children and the father’s refusal to accept safeguards in the contact agreement. The order preserved the possibility of contact while allowing suspension when necessary. It was therefore within the judge’s discretion on the particular facts.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the father’s appeal against the section 34(4) order.
• Barnet County Court made care orders and granted the local authority permission under section 34(4) of the Children Act 1989 to suspend contact on 20 July 2012.