Johnson v Ministry of Defence & Anor

For actual knowledge under the Limitation Act 1980, section 14(1)(b), it was at least arguable that a claimant must have an actual belief, based on objective facts and matters actually known, that the injury was attributable to the alleged breach. Awareness that noisy work could cause hearing difficulty was not necessarily knowledge that the claimant’s own injury was attributable to that breach. The distinction justified permission to appeal against the limitation ruling.

The claimant brought a personal-injury claim for deafness allegedly caused by inadequate protection from loud machinery during employment with the Ministry of Defence and Hobourn Eaton Limited. Breach of duty was admitted, but the defendants argued that the claim was statute-barred. The Medway County Court decided that the claimant had actual knowledge by 2006 at the latest under section 14(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980, and therefore dismissed the claim as out of time. The claimant sought permission to appeal, contending that relevant knowledge arose only in October 2007 after legal advice and medical testing. The central issue was whether general awareness that noisy work could cause hearing problems amounted to actual knowledge that the claimant’s own deafness was attributable to the alleged breach.

1. Permission granted. The renewed application for permission to appeal was granted. Liability was not in issue because breach of duty had been admitted. The application concerned the preliminary limitation ruling.
2. Actual knowledge. The lower court had held that the claimant knew by 2006 that his deafness was attributable to the alleged breach, so proceedings issued later were out of time. The Court of Appeal considered it at least arguable that this analysis separated the claimant’s general awareness that noisy working conditions could cause hearing difficulty from his actual belief about the cause of his own deafness.
3. Meaning of attributable. Patten LJ considered that, for actual knowledge under section 14(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980, attributable meant capable of being attributed. The claimant must arguably have an actual belief, based on objective facts and matters actually known to him, which fixed him with knowledge that his injury was attributable to the alleged breach. The approach was informed by Lord Wilson’s discussion in Ministry of Defence v AB & Ors [2012] UKSC 9, paragraph 11, concerning the point at which a claimant first reasonably comes to believe the relevant facts.
4. The claimant had believed that age or ear-wax build-up caused his deafness, and in 2006 his general practitioner had attributed it to age rather than dockyard employment. Applying the stated approach, it was at least arguable that the required knowledge was not established by 2006. The court did not finally decide the limitation issue.
5. Constructive knowledge and mediation. Because the lower court had relied on actual knowledge, it had been unnecessary to consider constructive attribution under section 14(3). Ward LJ agreed and endorsed mediation under the Court of Appeal Mediation Scheme. Order: application granted.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 23 May 2012, the court granted the renewed application for permission to appeal and stated that the appeal should first undergo mediation under the Court of Appeal Mediation Scheme.
2. Medway County Court (His Honour Judge Scarratt): The court dismissed the personal-injury claim as out of time, holding that the claimant had actual knowledge by 2006 at the latest under section 14(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980.