Johnson, R. v

Where a juror encounters potentially prejudicial material outside court, the trial judge must make an appropriate, focused investigation. The issue is whether a fair-minded and informed observer would identify a real risk of bias, including a risk that the other jurors may be contaminated.

A juror or jury should be discharged only where necessity is established. The judge may rely on clear assurances from a juror who understands the duty to decide solely on the evidence and not to disclose the incident to fellow jurors. Further investigation is unnecessary where the essential circumstances and their relevance have been sufficiently established.

The appellant was convicted at Isleworth Crown Court of assault occasioning actual bodily harm against one police officer and common assault against another, following a violent struggle during his arrest. He appealed against conviction.

During the judge’s summing-up, a juror reported that she had overheard words spoken by a member of the appellant’s family outside court. She believed the words might have been directed at her because her son was a police officer. The judge questioned her about her ability to remain impartial and about any possible disclosure to the other jurors, but refused to discharge her.

The appeal concerned whether the judge’s response to that incident created a material irregularity rendering the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge was entitled to refuse to discharge the juror. His decision was within the range of reasonable responses and did not render the convictions unsafe.

2. The court reaffirmed that a judge has a discretion to discharge a juror or jury only where necessity is established: Windsor v R (1866) LR 1 QB 289. When an irregularity arises, the judge must investigate it appropriately. The inquiry may include questioning an affected juror, preferably after separation where practicable, but must be directed to possible compromise rather than the content of jury deliberations.

3. The relevant question was whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real risk of bias. The judge also had to consider whether the incident could contaminate the remaining jurors.

4. The juror’s note, although imperfectly expressed, made its essential point clear. Further inquiry into the precise words used or the reason why they may have been spoken was unnecessary. The judge properly focused on whether she could decide solely on the evidence and whether she had told, or would tell, other jurors about the incident.

5. The juror gave firm assurances that she would not be influenced by what she heard and would not disclose it. She demonstrated an understanding of her responsibilities, including the unfairness to the appellant of introducing material outside the evidence. The judge was entitled to rely on those assurances. His reasons sufficiently addressed any apparent risk of bias and jury contamination.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeal against conviction dismissed.
• Isleworth Crown Court: On 23 January 2012, the appellant was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and common assault. He received concurrent suspended sentences with unpaid-work and curfew requirements.