Semaj, R v

Fresh evidence which the appellate court finds incapable of belief and the product of collusion cannot be admitted in the interests of justice under Criminal Appeal Act 1968, section 23. Where that conclusion is reached, it is unnecessary to determine the remaining issues concerning the proposed fresh evidence. An asserted inconsistency in a principal witness’s evidence in separate trials will not render a conviction unsafe unless it provides a proper basis for doing so.

The appellant had been convicted at Manchester Crown Court of murder and wounding with intent following an attack at a takeaway. The prosecution case included evidence from B, who implicated the appellant in a joint attack using sticks.

After earlier proposed grounds concerning witness anonymity became unsustainable, the appellant relied on fresh evidence from Luan Gjecaj under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. Luan Gjecaj claimed that B had said, both before and after trial, that the appellant was innocent. The central issue was whether that evidence should be admitted and, if so, whether it made the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court declined to admit Luan Gjecaj’s proposed fresh evidence and therefore upheld the convictions.

2. The court was sure that Luan Gjecaj’s evidence was incapable of belief. His account conflicted with telephone records, his earlier statements and the documented police interviews. His claimed explanations for those inconsistencies were rejected.

3. The court found that Luan Gjecaj had concealed his close relationship with the appellant and had repeatedly sought to assist him. His claim that B had stated before trial that the appellant was innocent was an invention. The court was also sure that the appellant and Luan Gjecaj had colluded to advance dishonest evidence after other possible appeal grounds had failed.

4. Accordingly, it could not be in the interests of justice under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to admit evidence that was both incredible and collusive. It was unnecessary to decide the other issues raised under that provision.

5. Differences between B’s evidence at the appellant’s trial and at Jani’s trial did not provide a basis for finding the conviction unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The court refused to admit the proposed fresh evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and dismissed the appeal.
• Crown Court at Manchester: The appellant was convicted of murder and wounding with intent before HH Judge Goldstone QC and a jury.