Gul, R v

Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 applies according to its broad terms. An attack by insurgents on a government’s or coalition’s armed forces during a non-international armed conflict is terrorism if the statutory elements are met. There is no exemption based on armed resistance, self-defence, or combatant status.

Customary international law had not developed a rule requiring the statutory definition to be read down. A post-verdict allegation of juror internet research warrants further inquiry only exceptionally. The irregularity must give rise to evidence capable of affecting the fairness of the proceedings or the safety of the conviction.

The appellant was convicted at a retrial in the Central Criminal Court of five counts of disseminating terrorist publications, contrary to section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. The videos included material glorifying and encouraging attacks by insurgents on Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

After the jury retired, the judge directed that an explosives attack on Coalition forces in Iraq or Afghanistan in 2008 or 2009 would be terrorism under section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The appellant contended that attacks by insurgents on military forces in a non-international armed conflict were excluded from terrorism.

He also sought, shortly before the appeal hearing, to add a ground alleging that a juror had searched the internet for information about him. The central issue was whether the judge’s direction on the statutory definition of terrorism was correct.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The court held that the judge’s answer to the jury was correct. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were treated, on the accepted basis of the appeal, as non-international armed conflicts. That status did not exempt insurgents from domestic criminal liability.

2. Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is comprehensive. Subject to proof of its statutory elements, an attack by insurgents on the armed forces of a government, including Coalition forces, is terrorism. The provision contains no exemption for armed insurrection or armed struggle against a government.

3. International law did not require a narrower construction. Although international law distinguishes attacks on civilians from attacks on military personnel, and customary international law may develop further, the necessary widespread state practice or opinio juris excluding insurgent attacks on military forces from terrorism had not been established. The court therefore declined to read down the clear statutory language.

4. The earlier asylum authorities did not govern the issue. They had not applied the terms of section 1 and had been decided without the detailed international-law argument advanced in this appeal.

5. Leave to add the jury-irregularity ground was refused. Juror internet research is wrongful, but post-verdict investigation into jury deliberations is exceptional. There was no evidence that any search had revealed prejudicial material or led jurors to depart from the judge’s directions. The irregularity could not have affected trial fairness or the safety of the convictions.

6. Leave to appeal against sentence was also refused. The five-year sentence was at the upper end of the appropriate range but was not manifestly excessive, given the gravity of publications encouraging attacks on forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) The appellant’s conviction appeal was dismissed. Leave was refused on the proposed jury-irregularity ground and on sentence.
2. Central Criminal Court At a retrial before His Honour Judge Paget QC, the appellant was convicted of five counts of disseminating terrorist publications and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, less time on remand.