Friel, R. v

Hearsay evidence is not automatically inadmissible because it is central, or even sole and decisive, evidence. The court must apply the statutory admissibility gateways and safeguards under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Greater care is required as the evidence becomes more central.

The judge assesses whether hearsay is potentially safely reliable; its ultimate reliability remains for the jury. Recorded interviews, material capable of challenging the absent witness’s credibility, corroborative evidence, and clear jury directions may provide sufficient safeguards. Previous convictions may establish a continuing propensity to steal or use violence where they have substantial probative value and do not create disproportionate prejudice.

The appellant was convicted at Cambridge Crown Court of robbery and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that he and a co-accused forced entry into a flat, assaulted its occupants, and stole heroin. Both occupants later died from drug overdoses. Their recorded police interviews were admitted as first-hand and multiple hearsay.

The appellant appealed against conviction on two grounds. He contended that the deceased witness’s interviews, including what the other deceased occupant had told her, should have been excluded as unreliable hearsay. He also challenged the admission of previous convictions as bad-character evidence. The central issues were whether the hearsay was fairly and lawfully admitted, and whether the convictions established relevant propensities without unfair prejudice.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to admit the deceased witness’s recorded interviews and the multiple hearsay contained in them. The interviews fell within the statutory gateway because the maker was dead. The additional requirement for multiple hearsay was also satisfied.

2. Applying Riat [2012] EWCA Crim 1509, there is no inflexible rule that central, sole, or decisive hearsay is inadmissible. Its centrality is nevertheless important. The more central the hearsay, the greater the care required. The judge must decide whether it is sufficiently reliable to be safely left to the jury, rather than decide whether it is true.

3. The judge had approached admissibility with conspicuous care. The jury could watch the recorded interviews and assess the witness’s demeanour and fluency. They received full warnings about the inability to cross-examine her, her inconsistencies, and the two links that had to be proved before relying on the multiple hearsay. The witness’s drug addiction and the inconsistencies in her accounts did not make the evidence inadmissible. They were matters for the jury’s assessment.

4. There were substantial safeguards and independent supporting evidence. The account of heroin in a Kinder egg corresponded with the appellant’s police interview. Other overlaps, medical evidence, and a threatening telephone call from the appellant’s telephone also supported the prosecution case. The hearsay did not stand alone. There was therefore no basis to exclude it under section 78 of PACE 1984 or section 126 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, nor to stop the case under section 125.

5. The bad-character ruling was also correct. The appellant’s serious convictions between 1998 and 2005 were capable of establishing continuing propensities to steal and use violence. Their probative value was substantial and their admission did not create disproportionate prejudice.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction.
• Crown Court at Cambridge The appellant was convicted of robbery on 8 October 2010 and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment on 10 June 2011.