Browning v Lewes Crown Court & Anor

A certificate extending the usual time limit for prosecuting offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 need not be dated or served with the information or summons unless the statute requires it. A certificate identifying the date when sufficient evidence came to the prosecutor’s knowledge may properly state that the prosecutor acquired the knowledge through the person signing on the prosecutor’s behalf. An information is not invalid merely because it is undated or unsigned where neither the governing statute nor the applicable procedural rules impose those requirements. A claimant seeking an order compelling a Crown Court to state a case should generally be confined to points raised before that court and in the original application.

The claimant had been convicted in the Magistrates’ Court of offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006. The Crown Court at Lewes dismissed her appeal on 11 July 2011. It later refused her application to state a case concerning several alleged errors of law, including the prosecution time limit, the validity of the prosecutor’s certificate, the form of the information, and a £10,000 costs order in favour of the RSPCA.

The claimant sought judicial review of that refusal. The Administrative Court treated the permission hearing as a rolled-up hearing. The central issues were whether any of the proposed grounds had arguable substance and whether the Crown Court should have stated a case in relation to the costs order.

1. Outcome. The application was granted to the limited extent that the Crown Court was directed to state a case concerning its order requiring the claimant to pay £10,000 towards the RSPCA’s costs. Permission was otherwise refused.
2. The first two grounds, concerning the RSPCA’s authority to issue a certificate under section 31 and the extended prosecution time limit, could not succeed in light of Lamont Perkins v RSPCA [2012] EWHC 415 (Admin).
3. Section 31(2) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 required the certificate to be signed by or on behalf of the prosecutor and to state the date on which sufficient evidence came to the prosecutor’s knowledge. Properly interpreted, a certificate signed by a person acting for the prosecutor could state that the prosecutor acquired the requisite knowledge through that person. The certificate was therefore not invalid on the ground advanced.
4. There was no statutory requirement for the certificate to be dated or served when the information was laid or the summons issued. Such requirements could not properly be implied into section 31.
5. There was likewise no requirement that the information be signed by the informant or dated. Neither the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 nor the Criminal Procedure Rules imposed such a requirement.
6. The claimant could not substantially broaden the proceedings after the Crown Court hearing by introducing new arguments, including reliance on R v West London Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Klahn [1979] 1 WLR 933. The judicial review should be confined to points raised before the Crown Court and relied on in the original application to state a case.
7. The challenge to the costs order was neither unreasonable nor frivolous. The Crown Court had arguably failed to address matters material to whether an order should be made, including the defendant’s ability to pay within a reasonable time. It should therefore have stated a case on that issue.

• Crown Court at Lewes: On 11 July 2011, HH Judge Rennie and two magistrates dismissed the claimant’s appeal against convictions.
• Crown Court at Lewes: On 2 August 2011, HH Judge Rennie refused the claimant’s application to state a case.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The court directed the Crown Court to state a case concerning the £10,000 costs order, but otherwise refused permission for judicial review.